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Abstract
This thesis presents a formal role-model based on a combination of approaches towards role-
based access control. This model is used both for access control and information ranking.
Purpose: Healthcare information is required by law to be strictly secured. Thus an access con-
trol policy is needed, especially when this information is stored in a computer system. Roles,
instead of just users, have been used for enforcing access control in computer systems. When
a healthcare employee is granted access to information, only the relevant information should be
presented by the system, providing better overview and highlighting critical information stored
among less important data. The purpose of this thesis is to enable efficiency and quality im-
provements in healthcare by using IT-solutions that address both access control and information
highlighting.
Methods: We have developed a formal role model in a previous project. It has been manually
tested, and some possible design choices were identified. The project report pointed out that
more work was required, in the form of making design choices, implementing a prototype, and
extending the model to comply with the Norwegian standard for electronic health records.
In preparing this thesis, we reviewed literature about the extensions that we wanted to make to
that model. This included deontic logic, delegation and temporal constraints. We made decisions
on some of the possible design choices. Some of the topics that were presented in the previous
project are also re-introduced in this thesis. The theories are explained through examples, which
are later used as a basis for an illustrating scenario. The theory and scenario were used for
requirement elicitation for the role-model, and for validating the model.
Based on these requirements a formal role-model was developed. To comply with the Norwegian
EHR standard the model includes delegation and context based access control. An access control
list was also added to allow for patients to limit or deny access to their record information for
any individual. To validate the model, we implemented parts of the model in Prolog and tested it
with data from the scenario.
Results: The test results show rankings for information and controls access to it correctly, thus
validating the implemented parts of the model. Other results are a formal model, an executable
implementation of parts of the model, recommendations for model design, and the scenario.
Conclusions: Using the same role-model for access control and information ranking works,
and allows using flexible ways to define policies and information needs.
Keywords: role-based access control, information ranking, healthcare informatics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The healthcare sector is very information intensive. By law, information is generated and recorded
every time a patient is examined or treated. This information may be acquired from different
equipment and persons, and then shared among and interpreted by healthcare workers. These
professionals need and want different subsets of the medical information. They should not be
compelled to spend excessive amounts of time or effort finding the information, lest they miss
critical information or waste time better spent on patient care. E.g. a doctor would be interested
in a patient’s present medical conditions and medication, while a secretary would care more
about information pertaining to administrative tasks.
All information about patients must be protected to ensure its confidentiality and correctness. On
the social and legal level, information is protected by law and the morals of healthcare workers.
As availability is increased by the use of information technology, there is an increase in both the
opportunity for malicious activities and in their potential magnitude. Because of this heightened
risk, information technology must take part in managing security.
There is a lot of work going on to provide decision support in healthcare, and structuring and
standardizing healthcare information. Decision support is researched and applied at various lev-
els of advancement. Scholars are seriously asking each other whether the benefits of higher levels
of advancement are outweighed by more stringent demands on information entry. An issue re-
lated to traditional decision support is the emphasizing of information. If the decision support
system is not advanced enough to make a diagnosis or noticing a mistake on its own, it could still
be strong enough to emphasize information that is important. It is this level of decision support
that is the focus of this thesis.
In this thesis, we want to show that a model for ranking and access control developed by us earlier
actually could be implemented in computer-executable form, and then advancing this model just
enough to fulfill requirements in the Norwegian laws and standards.
The rest of this introduction is devoted first to express the research goals and method of work,
and second to an outline of this thesis.
1
1 Introduction
1.1 Research Goals and Examples
From the problem description we have developed a few research goals. The research goals are
used to guide and evaluate this thesis. They are also a means to make the thesis relevant and
interesting. Because the research goals stated here cover a relatively large area, some design
choices are made later on in this thesis. The research goals are also the basis for the discussion
in chapter 9. A prerequisite to be able to perform these research goals is a literature study of
the existing role-models. In addition we have to study the Norwegian electronic health record
standard.
Research goal number one: Create a modularized role-model for access control and information
ranking. It is important that the model is compliant to the Norwegian EHR standard. The pos-
sibility and value of a modularized approach is discussed and the model is verified both from
formal definitions and a simple prototype role-model implemented in Prolog.
Research goal number two: We will clarify the concepts of information ranking, both through
formal expression and through given examples. The concepts of information ranking is also to
be represented through the Prolog prototype.
Research goal number three: We choose to use deontic logic to formalize the model we develop,
thus we need to motivate and argue for this choice. It is outside the scope of this thesis to develop
a new language, but we present a suitable formalism from the literature.
Research goal number four: The final research goal is to state the value of this thesis and how
this can be used in future development.
1.1.1 Method
To illustrate different problems and possible solutions, we are using examples based on situations
that can occur in the healthcare service. These examples are running throughout the thesis and
be extended with more information and context to demonstrate various concepts and choices.
Example 1 introduces how these examples look like and also introduces the main problem this
thesis addresses.
2
1.2 Thesis Outline
Example 1
When the patient Elisa is put in contact with a hospital for a problem, the
hospital secretary needs to book an appointment. To book the appointment,
the secretary needs to know name and personal security number of Elisa.
When the appointment takes place the doctor needs to have information
about the patient’s past medical history, the current problem and the doctor
may need to order some tests or prescribe some drugs. Both the permissions
given to and the information needed for the secretary and doctor is different.
A solution to this is assigning the different users to different roles, for
instance assigning Alice to the doctor role, and assigning permissions to
these roles. For instance the doctor role has access to most of the clinical
record information.
Based upon the examples we give, we create a scenario. The scenario helps to define some of the
general requirement for the model. These general requirements and a set of requirements that
we create to limit the scope of the model, form the basis for the model design. The model we
develop is a combination of different approaches towards RBAC and we try to develop the model
in different modules in such a way that each module adds functionality to the model. The model
is subsequently implemented in Prolog and the implementation is tested in order to validate the
model. This validation is done by using the scenario as input to the Prolog implementation of the
model.
The implementation of the formal model provides the ability to express and test different qual-
ities of the model. Thus an assumption is that the language may be implemented, thus making
logic expression like:
assigned users : (r : ROLES)→ 2USERS , the mapping of role r onto a set of users. Formally:
assigned users(r) = u ∈ USERS|(u, r) ∈ UA.
can later be written as a Prolog rule like:
user assigned roles(user, role list).
The model is able to give a suggestion for how to support access control and how to handle
the enormous amount of information in healthcare industry. Important to the model is that it
complies with the described rules for access control in the Norwegian EHR standard [Nys05].
1.2 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents a modal (deontic and action) first order many sorted language named LDA .
We also briefly motivate for the choice to use deontic logic in this thesis. The formalism is later
used to express different properties of the role-model.
3
1 Introduction
Chapter 3 introduces different approaches to access control. The chapter then focuses on different
approaches and models for role-based access control, especially the NIST standard. The chapter
also motivates for how RBAC can be used in healthcare and a review of the Norwegian EHR
standard, which is very important to this thesis.
Chapter 4 motivates and explains the concepts of information ranking. In particular it describes
how information can be ranked both as relevance and detail. The chapter also introduces infor-
mation classes and information hierarchies, which are very important to make administration of
access control and information ranking efficient.
Chapter 5 presents a scenario, which is used to test the model. From the scenario we describe
some general requirements for an access control model. The chapter also presents a set of re-
quirements for the model, that place a greater limitations on the development.
Chapter 6 presents a formalized role-model. The model is based on theories described in the
thesis and is developed to comply with the Norwegian EHR standard. The model is able to
support delegation, context dependent access and information ranking. The model is completed
with rules and functions, that evaluate the access and ranking a user is given.
Chapter 7 is a presentation of the Prolog implementation of the model. The chapter presents
the code structure and how the facts in the scenario are implemented and it presents the most
important predicates of the implementation.
Chapter 8 presents the results and key findings of the testing and validation of the model.
Chapter 9 contains the discussion and evaluation of this thesis. It discusses the design choices we
make and how successful they are. The chapter also presents possible application of the model
and suggestions for future work.
Chapter 10 presents the conclusions for this thesis.
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Chapter 2
The Formalism: Deontic logic
The possibility to express the role-model in a formal language is the key to proving the correct-
ness and quality of the model. We have chosen to present the model in deontic logic and it is
therefore necessary to present a formalism based on deontic logic. Deontic logic is originally de-
veloped for use in an ethical and legal context, but has later been found useful to express norms
in any intelligent systems including artificial intelligence systems. The application of deontic
logic in role-based access control as discussed Kolaczek [Kol02], concludes that deontic logic,
as it formalizes the notions of obligation, prohibition and permission, corresponds in a natural
way to specificity of access control activities.
This chapter presents a formalism for deontic logic and how we intend to use this formalism in
the development of the model.
2.1 Language
This is a partial quotation of LDA as described by Pacheco & Santos in Delegation in a Role-
Based Organization [PS04].
LDA is a modal (deontic and action) first order many sorted language. The non-modal compo-
nent of LDA is used to express factual descriptions, and properties and relationships between
agents. It contains a finite number of sorts, not related with agents or roles, and three special
sorts: Ag (the agent sort), R (the role sort) and AgR (the agent in a role sort).
Those sorts have variables and constants, but there are no moment variables of theAgR sort.There
may be functions between these sorts, but no function with Ag as co-domain is considered (the
terms of sort Ag are either variables or constants). The terms of each of these sorts are defined
as usual.
LDA also contains a finite number of role generators, generically denoted by rg, of sort (→ R).
There is always a role generator , denoted by itself.Moreover, for each role generator rg, there
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exists a predicate (qualification predicate), denoted by is−rg of sort (Ag) and denotes a property
that an agent may have.
The terms of the sorts R and AgR are built as follows:
1. if rg is of sort (→ R), then rg() is a term of sort R (rg is written instead of rg());
2. if t is a term of sort Ag and r is a term of sort R, then t : r is a term of sort AgR.
r, r1, . . . , is used to generically refer to roles, and a, a1, . . . , to generically refer to a term of
sort Ag (either a constant or a variable), and t, t1, . . . , are used generically refer to terms of the
appropriate sorts. Finally , a : a is used as an abbreviation of a:itself, and qual(a : rg)is an
abbreviation of is− rg(a), and intuitively means that agent a is qualified to play the role rg.
The formulas ofLDA are inductively defined as follows:
1. if p is a predicate symbol of sort (s1, . . . , sn) and t1, . . . , tn are terms of sort s1, . . . , sn,
then p(t1, . . . , tn) is an atomic formula;
2. if B is a formula, then ¬B is a formula;
3. if B1 and B2 are formulas then (B1 ∧B2) is a formula;
4. if B is a formula and xs is a variable of sort s, then (∀xs)B is a formula;
5. ifB is a formula and a : r is a term of sortAgR, thenEa:rB,Oa:rB and Pa:rB are formulas;
The other standard logical connectives (∨,→ and ↔) and the existential quantifiers are in-
troduced through the usual abbreviation rules, and parentheses may be omitted assuming the
following priorities: first ∧; then ∨; and finally→ and↔. The forbidding operator is defined as
follows: Fa:r
abv
= ¬Pa:rB
2.1.1 Axiomatizations
We list some of the principles discussed by Pacheco & Camaro [PC03], where a more details can
be found. It is assumed that all tautologies are axioms of this logic, and that the rule of Modus
Ponens is valid.
The general properties of quantifiers and the generalization rule (if ` B then ` (∀x)B), and the
following axioms take part:
(∀x)(B1 → B2)→ ((∀x)B1 → (∀x)B2)
B → (∀x)B, if x does not occur free in B
(∀x)B → B[xfree/t], for t a constant of sort s or a variable x1
such that x does not occur free in B within the scope of (∀x1).
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(B[xsfree/t] denotes the formula we obtain when we replace (in B) the free occurrences of xs
by t.)
The formal properties of the action operator Ea:r are described [below]:
Axioms
(TE) Ea:rB → B
(CE) Ea:rA ∧ Ea:rB → Ea:r(A ∧B)
(Qual) Ea:rB → qual(a : r)
(Itself ) (∀x)qual(x :itself )
Proof rule:
(REE) If ` A↔ B then ` Ea:rA↔ Ea:rB
With respect to the formal properties of the deontic operators, and of the relationships between
each other and with the action operator, the following axioms and proof-rules are considered:
Axioms
(CO) Oa:rA ∧Oa:rB → Oa:r(A ∧B)
(O → P ) Oa:rB → Pa:rB
(O → ¬P¬) Oa:rB → ¬Pa:r¬B
(O ∧ P ) Oa:rA ∧ Pa:rB → Pa:r(A ∧B)
Proof rules:
(REO) If ` A↔ B then ` Oa:rA↔ Oa:rB
(RMP ) If ` A→ B then ` Pa:rA↔ Pa:rB
(RMEP ) If ` Ea1:r1A→ Ea2:r2B then ` Pa1:r1A→ Pa2 : r2B
2.1.2 Extensions to the Formalism
The formalism described needs to be extended in order to be able to handle delegation. The
extensions dealing with delegation is already described by Pacheco & Santos and we quote a brief
summary of this: The deontic characterization of a role in an organization is part of the identity
of the organization and does not depend on the agent that holds that role in a particular moment.
To capture this idea, deontic notions are attached to roles, but they are actually interpreted as
applied to the holders of such roles, when acting in such roles(. . . ). Thus no new operators are
introduced, but just new abbreviations:
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(OrB)
abv
= (∀x)qual(x : r)→ Ox:rB
(PrB)
abv
= (∀x)qual(x : r)→ Px:rB
(FrB)
abv
= (∀x)qual(x : r)→ Fx:rB
[PS04, p. 213–215] We have not extended this formalism any further, but we believe it is suffi-
cient to express the model we develop as it is.
2.2 Application of the Language
Although the language LDA are explained pretty closely, the model we develop will not follow
it completely. This is because there are some differences between the application of the language
as presented by Pacheco & Santos [PS04] and how we intend to express the model. We have tried
to identify where the model will be using the language and where there are important differences.
The formulas and standard logical connectives are of course valid for the model. The deontic
properties of the language are also important to why we chose this language and are therefore a
subject for use in the model. The language we have presented are used to express agents behavior
in normative systems. Even if this should hold for the model, we want to limit the conceptual
application to only include access control and information ranking in a healthcare organization.
This implies for instance that we use the concept of users in a healthcare organization instead of
agents in an organization. In addition the model have to express some context dependency and
this also have to be solved.
A proof of how to translate a particular class of role-based access control modal model formulae
into a form of the first order Horn clauses can be found in Kolaczek’s article on deontic logic in
RBAC [Kol02]. That proof is not included in this thesis.
The application of the language for expressing the model and how well suited the language
actually is in addition to the discussion of the implementation of the language is thoroughly
examined in chapter 9.
2.3 Summary
This chapter introduces the languageLDA which is a modal (deontic and action) first order many
sorted language. This language has the properties we stated in research goal number three on
page 1. We have also tried to foresee how well suited this language is to express the model and
potential limitations or problems with the langauge, though this is thourghly discussd in chapter
9.
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Chapter 3
Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) has become a well-accepted and well-known approach for
authorization and access control. RBAC is a way of encoding security policies, where privileges
are granted to roles instead of directly to subjects [FKC03]. RBAC cannot be standardized as a
single model; it is more appropriate to think of it as a family of models, and this is reflected in
the standardization work [San01].
This chapter begins with a short overview of access control. We then present the NIST standard
for role-based access control, which is later used as the basis for the role-model in chapter 6.
Thereafter we present some possible extensions to the NIST standard, which are needed in order
to make a role-model compliant to the Norwegian EHR-standard. At the end of this chapter we
present, in short, the Norwegian EHR standard. This presentation motivates for the use of RBAC
and the extensions we have presented.
3.1 Access Control Types
This is a short overview of access control types, found as section 4.1 of the specialization project
[SØ04, p. 17].
Access control is the process of granting subjects (users or processes) access to perform opera-
tions on objects (files, processes or data fields) [Gol99, pp. 30–45]. Role-based access control is
an alternative to the more traditional form of access. There are three basic access control models
[Fra03],[PHS03, pp. 565–589]:
• Discretionary access control (DAC), usually identity based. An access control matrix gives
full control over what operations any subject can perform on any object; but a full matrix
may be too complex to be practical for security management. To make access grants
simpler, permissions are often given per object, as an access control list, or per subject, as
a capability. The access control list is used by the owner of the object to give other subjects
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access to the object. Capabilities are defined by the system administrator and give subjects
access to objects based on the needs of subjects.
• Mandatory access control (MAC), based on levels, and found primarily in the military
or other highly sensitive systems. This is based on classifying objects according to the
sensitivity of the data and giving subjects a clearance, or authorization level. A user is
granted access only when the user and object have corresponding clearance levels. The
access method may permit reading from lower levels, but not reading from higher levels.
It may permit writing to a higher level, but not writing to a lower level.
• Non-discretionary access control, usually role-based, centrally administrated with autho-
rization decisions based on the roles individuals have within the organization. The system
administrator grants and revokes system privilege based on the user’s role.
The basic models may be used in pure form, or be combined with each other, to provide more
fine-grained access control. On the flip-side, one could reduce granularity in other ways, e.g. by
defining a privilege as a ordered set, where a higher privilege includes all lower privileges.
3.2 Role-based Access Control
The preferred information system of use for RBAC would exhibit the following characteristic
[RC99]: For users; a large number of users, few security administrators, and frequent change
of job responsibility. For data and applications; there are large numbers of data and sharing
objects based on job functions. For enterprises; the data is owned by the enterprise, controlled
by security administrators, before and after the fact audit, and periodic assessment of access
control policy enforcement necessary. Ferraiolo, Cugini and Kuhn [FCK95] believe the principal
motivation behind RBAC is the ability to express and enforce enterprise-specific security policies
and streamline the typical burdensome process of security management.
The essence of role-based access control is that system permissions are assigned to defined roles
rather than to individual users. And therefore the basis of RBAC is the concept of a role. A role
is a type grouping that categorizes subjects based on various properties. These properties pertain
to the functional responsibilities of the user in the organization.
3.2.1 RBAC Characteristics and Policies
RBAC policies are described in terms of users, subjects, roles, role hierarchies, operations and
protected object. We have listed some of the characteristics stated by Ferraiolo, Cugini and
Kuhn[FCK95]:
• Role-hierarchy defines roles that have unique attributes and that may contain other roles.
• Role authorization can be subject to the following:
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1. The user can not be given more privilege than necessary in order to perform his/her
job (principle of least privilege).
2. The role, in which the user is gaining membership, is not mutually exclusive with
another role, for which the user already possesses membership (static separation of
duty).
3. The numerical limitation that exists for role membership cannot be exceeded (cardi-
nality property).
• Role activation involves the mapping of a user to one or possibly many roles. A particular
role for a user can be activated if:
1. The user is authorized for the role being proposed for activation.
2. The activation of the proposed role is not mutually exclusive with any other active
role(s) for the user.
3. The proposed operation is authorized for the role that is being proposed for activation.
4. The operation being proposed is consistent within a mandatory sequence operation.
• Role execution of an operation can take place only if the subject is acting within an active
role.
• Dynamic separation of duty can be provided in RBAC if a subject can become active in a
new role only if the proposed role is not mutually exclusive with any of the roles, in which
the subject is currently active.
• Operation authorization can only be granted to a subject if the operation is authorized for
the subject’s proposed active role.
• Operational separation of duty requires that for all the operations associated with a partic-
ular business function, no single user can be allowed to perform all of these operations.
• Object access authorization requires subject access to RBAC objects to be controlled. A
subject can access an object only if:
1. The role is part of the subjects current active role set.
2. The role is allowed to perform the operation.
3. The operation to access the object is authorized.
3.2.2 RBAC Constraints
RBAC also enables administrators to place constraints on role authorization, role activation and
operation execution. In RBAC separation of duty is a well known control principle in man-
agement. Separation of duty can be seen as mission critical combination of tasks required to
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be performed by different people and it prevents accidental or malicious violation of business
requirements [Cra03]. Separation of duty can be divided into static, dynamic and historical sep-
aration of duty. A more detailed description of static and dynamic separation of duty is given in
the description of the NIST standard. Historical separation of duty is, as the name implies, based
on historical or logged states and events in the system. Historical constraints are more difficult
to enforce than static and dynamic constraints, but a proposed method of enforcing this would
be to create a blacklist of request, that would cause a constraint to be violated. This method
raises some new matters to the prior, for instance a poorly specified set of constraints may lead
to situations where no user can invoke a particular method on a particular object.
3.3 The NIST Standard for Role-Based Access Control
The NIST standard is a proposed standard for RBAC. The proposed standard tries to resolve a
situation where no single authoritative definition of RBAC exists. The standard solves this by
unifying ideas from a base of frequently referenced RBAC models, commercial products and re-
search prototypes. It does not try to standardize RBAC features beyond those that have achieved
acceptance in the commercial marketplace and research community. The NIST standard is or-
ganized in two main parts: the RBAC reference model and the RBAC functional specification.
These two main parts are in turn organized into four RBAC components; core elements, hierar-
chical RBAC, static separation of duties relations and dynamic separation of duties relations.
The reference model provides a rigorous definition of RBAC sets and relations. It has two pri-
mary objectives: to define a common vocabulary of terms for use in consistently specifying
requirements and to set the scope of the RBAC features included in the standard. There is a
reference model for each of the four RBAC components.
“Each model component is defined by the sub components:
• A set of basic elements sets;
• A set of RBAC relations involving those element sets [...]; and
• A set of Mapping Functions, which yield instances of members from one ele-
ment set for a given instance from another element set.
”
[FSG+01, p. 232]
3.3.1 Core RBAC
Core RBAC, as defined in figure 3.1 from [FSG+01], covers the essential parts of RBAC and is
required for any RBAC system. The core elements include five basic data elements, which are
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users, roles, objects, operations and permissions. In addition the core RBAC model includes a
set of sessions. The basic concept of RBAC is that users are assigned to roles, permissions are
assigned to roles (as illustrated in example 2) and users acquire permissions by being members of
roles. It is required that user-role and permission-role assignment is a many-to-many relationship.
It is also required that users can be able to simultaneously exercise permissions of multiple roles.
To introduce the concept of user sessions allows selective activation and deactivation of roles.
Example 2
Typical roles in a scenario are “Discharging doctor for the patient Elisa”, “doctor on call on
ward B” or a “secretary on ward B”. For instance, the discharging doctor have read access to all
record information for the current period of care and update access to recent information created
by him-/herself. The doctor on call may only have read access to recent information. Both the
actual role assignment and activation are discussed later in chapter 6.
A user is defined as a human being in the NIST standard. Although the concept of a user can
be extended to include other machines or systems, we find this definition appropriate for this
thesis. A role can be a job function or job title within the context of an organization with some
associated semantics regarding the authority and responsibility conferred on a member of the
role. Permissions in RBAC are defined as the operations that are permitted to be performed on
an object. Operations are functions that is performed on the object. What types of operations
that exist depend upon what kind of application is implemented, i.e. read, write and execute for a
file system and create, update, delete for a DBMS. An object is an entity that contains or receives
information. This can for instance be files or directories in an operating system or columns, rows,
tables or views in a DBMS. It can also be some other system resource like printers, disk space or
CPU cycles.
3.3.2 Hierarchical RBAC
This model component adds requirements for supporting role hierarchies. Figure 3.2 shows how
role hierarchy are included in the references model. The NIST standard recognizes two types
of role hierarchies: general hierarchical RBAC and limited hierarchical RBAC. General role
hierarchies provide multiple inheritance, while limited role hierarchies are restricted to a single
immediate descendant. Multiple inheritances provide important hierarchy properties. The first
is the ability to compose a role from multiple subordinate roles, second is the ability to provide
uniform treatment of user-role assignment relations and role-role inheritance relations.
The hierarchies are means for reflecting the organizational structure and responsibilities. Role
hierarchies may also define inheritance relationships between roles. Because of this, role hi-
erarchies, the security policy is easier to administer. An example of a role hierarchy for staff
members in a hospital is given in figure 3.3. In this figure user membership is inherited top-
down and role-permissions are inherited bottom up. We emphasize that this is not a complete
staff member hierarchy for a hospital. In example 3 we illustrate how users can be placed in a
hierarchy.
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Figure 3.1: Core RBAC in NIST standard [FSG+01]
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Figure 3.2: RBAC with role hierarchy in NIST standard [FSG+01]
Figure 3.3: Example role hierarchy for staff members
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Example 3
In figure 3.4 users are put into the role hierarchy. Alice is assigned to the
cardiologist role and is authorized as a doctor and a staff member. Bob is
assigned to the secretary role and is authorized as a staff member. Darth
is assigned to the physiatrist role and is authorized as a doctor and a staff
member. Ken is assigned both the urologist role and the surgeon role and is
authorized as a doctor and a staff member. Although the role assignments
for Alice, Bob and Darth could be represented in a limited hierarchy the role
assignment for Ken could not. In a limited role hierarchy users would be
omitted because core RBAC requires a many-to-many relationship for user-
role assignment.
Figure 3.4: Users included in the hierarchy
16
3.3 The NIST Standard for Role-Based Access Control
3.3.3 Constrained RBAC
The NIST standard adds two types of constraints to the RBAC model, namely static separation
of duties and dynamic separation of duties.
Static separation of duty is one way to enforce conflict of interests policies, that organizations
may employ to prevent users from exceeding a reasonable level of authority for their posi-
tions. The simple explanation of static separation of duty, is that if a user is assigned to one
role, the user is prohibited from being member of a second role, i.e. the two roles are mu-
tual exclusive. Example 4 illustrates how two roles can be mutually exclusive. The static
constraints defined in the NIST standard are limited to those relations that place restric-
tions on a set of roles and in particular on their ability to form user-assignment relations.
SSD relations define and place constraints on a user’s total permission space. As seen in
figure 3.5 the static separation of duties is enforced on user-role assignment and the role
hierarchy directly. SSD constraints can be defined both in the presence and absence of role
hierarchies.
Example 4
A user that activates a role as a doctor signing a discharge paper can never
activate a role as a doctor who countersigns on the same discharge paper. this
task places a static separation of duty constraints on the two roles, because
the signing and counter signing of the discharge paper has to be done by two
different users.
Dynamic separation of duty is another way of enforcing conflict of interest, but differs from
static separation of duty by the context, in which the limitations are imposed. DSD in-
troduces properties that limit the availability of the permissions over a user’s permission
space. This is done by placing constraints on the roles that can be activated within or across
a user’s session. DSD extends the support for the principle of least privilege. We believe,
that in a healthcare organization, this type of separation of duty is more relevant. This is
because a user may require to act in several roles, but it may be necessary to prevent the
user to act in these roles during the same session. Example 5 tries to illustrate this. As seen
in figure 3.6, dynamic separation of duties is not enforced on user-role assignment, but on
the roles acquired during a session.
Example 5
Alice will in a particular situation activate the role as an doctor on call on
ward B, thus she has access to information regarding all patients treated
at ward B. She is unable to access information regarding the patient on
ward C, if the doctor on call on ward C is required to be another user,
thus enforcing the principle of least privilege. Alice can still be both doc-
tor on call on ward C, she just have to deactivate her role as doctor on ward B.
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Figure 3.5: RBAC with static separation of duty in NIST standard [FSG+01]
Figure 3.6: RBAC with dynamic separation of duty in NIST standard [FSG+01]
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3.3.4 Functional Specification
In order to meet the requirements for each of the components defined in the earlier sections,
the standard provides an overview of the functionality involved. There are three categories of
functions in the specification, and their purpose are:
• Administrative functions: creation and maintenance of elements sets and relations for
building the various components in RBAC models;
• Supporting system functions: functions that are required by the RBAC implementation
to support the RBAC model constructs.
• Review functions review the results of the actions created by administrative functions.
We have not made use of the functional specification in a noticeable degree later in this thesis
and therefore the reader is referred to the NIST standard [FSG+01] for a complete specification
of these functions. The prolog implementation is made for a purpose that not requires a complete
implementation of this specification.
3.4 Other Role-models
Several different other solutions to role-based models exist. We present some of these here and
use them later to provide a reasonable extension to the NIST standard, which is used as a basis
for the role-model. This improvement focuses on role-based delegation and context based access
control. Role-based access control, in associating privileges with roles, provides the means to
express access control, that is scalable to a large number of principals. Pure RBAC associates
privileges only with roles, whereas applications, and indeed the Norwegian EHR-standard, often
require more fine-grained access control. We present here both temporal RBAC and role-based
delegation, as approaches to this problem. In addition we present in short some of the work done
by Bacon [BMY02] which approaches context through parametrization of roles and delegation
through an appointment model.
3.4.1 RBAC and Delegation
There are several different approaches to role-based delegation described in the literature, but it
typically refers to delegation like this: One active entity in a system delegates its authority to
another entity, to carry out some functions on behalf of the former [ZAC02]. In a system, this
activity can be performed between:
• user and user
• user and machine
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• machine and machine
Here we focus on user to user delegation, which is most relevant for a healthcare organization.
In situations where personnel are on vacation, have too many patients or are ill themselves, they
need to be able to delegate their obligations and permissions to other professionals. In addition
there are some tasks, hence obligation and permissions, which are always delegated to achieve
effectiveness in the organization; this might be a secretary writing a record entry on behalf of a
doctor. This gives this informal definition of delegation, freely after Pacheco and Santos [PS04]
“user X, acting in role R1, delegates on user Y, acting in role R, the obligation to bring about ∅
and permission to bring about ψ ”
There are two views of delegation summarized by Linn and Nystrøm [LN99]: In administratively
directed delegation; an administrative infrastructure outside the direct control of a user mediates
delegation, which means that a security officer must mediate delegation. In user directed dele-
gation; any user’s system may mediate delegation to resources under the user’s control. In both
situations it is necessary to enforce predefined delegation policies to prevent power abuses by
individual users. Moreover there are several characteristics related to delegation. Barka and
Sandhu [BS00] identify a set of these characteristics, which include permanence (refers to dele-
gation in relation to time duration); totality (refers to the completeness of the delegation of roles);
and levels of delegation (refers to the transitivity of delegation, i.e. whether a delegated permis-
sion can be passed on to others). Figure 3.7 illustrates how delegated roles are related to users
and where delegation restriction occurs. Similar to this, Pacheco and Santos identify [PS04]
some choices that have to be made when setting the security policy for delegation, including
how delegation takes place and what is delegated. They formalize this using the language we
adopted from them earlier in chapter 2.1, hence giving a deontic approach towards delegation.
Delegation and Revocation
Another issue relating to delegation is revocation. Revocation is important if for instance a
professional should abuse his or her delegated permission. Then the delegator could revoke these
permissions. The paper A rule-based framework for role-based delegation [ZAC01] suggests two
ways of revoke delegation, using duration-restriction constraint or allowing user revocation. The
former approach is vulnerable to the setting of time periods, but it is important when it comes
to delegating obligations. The latter suggestion may be split into grant-dependent and grant-
independent revocation. Grant-dependent revocation allows only the user, which has delegated
the obligations and/or permissions, to revoke them, whereas grant-independent revocation allows
any user in the original role to revoke any delegated role. User revocation is illustrated in example
6.
Example 6
If Alice is assigned the doctor role, she may delegate the task of writing a record entry to her
secretary. If it is only Alice who may revoke this delegation, it is grant dependent revocation. If
any user acting in the doctor role can revoke this delegation, it is grant independent revocation.
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Figure 3.7: User-role relation with delegation
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Delegation Depth and Width
To control role proliferation the paper [ZAC01] suggests to put constraints on delegation depth
(transitivity) and width. The set depth dictates how many, if any, times the obligation or permis-
sion to be delegated may be delegated on to others. The width dictates how many persons may
receive the delegated permissions at the same time. This can be done using boolean control or
integer control. Having boolean control can impose restriction both on depth and width, letting
the delegating user decide if the obligation and permissions can be further delegated. The draw-
back is that boolean control depends on individual users themselves to set constraints, if or if not
further delegation may take place. By using integer control it is possible to decide the maximum
depth, but there is not possible to control the width of delegation. A solution to this, is using a
combination with integer control on high level delegation and boolean control on lower levels.
Example 7 illustrates how boolean and integer control can be used.
Example 7
If Alice has the role as a senior resident, she can delegate the responsibility to write a record
entry to an intern. If there is boolean control, Alice can decide if the delegation she makes can be
further delegated (true or false). If she decides true, she is no longer in control of who receives
the delegated responsibilities. If she decides false, the responsibility of writing the record entry
has to be borne by the intern and no one else. If there is integer control, let’s say of value 2, Alice
may still delegate the task of writing the record entry to the intern, but the intern may delegate
this further down to a secretary. The secretary can not delegate this any further regardless of
what the intern might say.
When we develop and formalize the model, we try to identify which restrictions on delegation
that are required in order to comply with the Norwegian EHR standard. Here, an important aspect
of delegation is that all actions may be regarded as transitive delegations from the patient or a
patient guardian. This is referred to as patient consent. Another problem we encounter, when
formalizing delegation is informal or implicit delegation, which have not been addressed in the
referenced literature.
3.4.2 Temporal RBAC
Temporal constraints are formal statements of access policies, that involve time-based restric-
tions on access to resources. They can be used to control time sensitive activities in workflow
management systems, or they can be used to limit role availability and activation capability in
designated periods. Depending upon the application requirement, there can be defined different
temporal constraints. Ferraiolo, Kuhn and Chandramouli [FKC03] define these categories as:
• Temporal constraints on roles;
• Temporal constraints on user-role assignments;
• Temporal constraints on role-permission assignments.
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To support temporal RBAC it is required to represent time. Two time-related concepts, period-
icity and duration, are presented in Generalized TRBAC (GTRBAC) Part I [JBGL01]. The two
concepts are used to represent periodicity-type temporal constraints and duration-type temporal
constraints, respectively. The representation is as follows:
• Periodicity: A periodic time is represented by the pairs ([Begin, End], P), where P is the
periodic expression, denoting a set (possible infinite) of periodic time instants, and [Begin,
End] is a time interval, denoting the lower and upper bounds that are imposed on instants
in P. For example the representation([17.01.2005, 18.07.2005], Friday 08.30) represents
all the scheduled supervisor meetings for our master thesis.
• Duration: A duration is simply represented by a symbol D, which stands for either an
expression or a numeral.
In GTRBAC temporal constraints have the generic form (X, E), where X is a periodic time or
duration and E is an event. Constraints on roles in GTRBAC [JBGL01] are specified making a
clear distinction between the concepts of role enabling and role activation, where an enabled role
is said to be activated, when a user acquires the permissions assigned to that role. Role-enabling
and -disabling are examples of events in GTRBAC. Example 8 illustrates how weekend shifts
may be defined in an organization.
Example 8
An event of role-enabling for a periodicity-type will be (([01.01.2005,
31.12.2005], Friday 1600 - Monday 0800), enable weekend-shift), which
states that in the year 2005 weekend shifts is from Friday at 1600 to Monday
at 0800.
Because role-activation is done at the user discretion, there is no periodicity-type constraints, but
there may be a duration constraint on how long a user can activate a role. Temporal constraints on
user-role assignments are constructs to express the specific interval or duration a user is assigned
to a role. Temporal constraints on role-permission assignment are constructs to express the spe-
cific interval or duration a permission is assigned to a role. There may also be specified other
requirements associated with temporal constraints. For example that an event requires another
event to occur. Such an event can be expressed by role-triggers.
Having temporal constraints allow for runtime requests as well. Bertino, Bonatti and Ferrari only
describe [BBF01] run-time request for security administrators, but it is described both for users
and administrators in GTRBAC. A user may make a request for activation of a role at run-time
within a user session, for instance the emergency access – if emergency access is regulated with
roles.
Supporting temporal constraints in the RBAC model affect the semantics of the role hierarchies
specified in the model. The presence of various timing constraints, relating to role-enabling or
role-activation and role-permission assignments, result in dynamic hierarchies called temporal
hierarchies. These hierarchies do not possess the complete permissions inheritance found in the
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role hierarchies of RBAC models, without the associated constraints.
Using temporal expressions in a model, allow for access control based on the context in which
access is needed, and in addition it provides the means for ranking information based on this
context. Run-time requests allow the context to change dynamically, and therefore support the
policy of least privilege. In addition it could be very useful for changing relevance and detail
ranking, described later in chapter 4. Having periodicity-type and duration-type expressions also
make it possible to have temporal constraints on delegation.
Based on [JBGL01] and [BBF01] the periodic expressions and run-time requests are included
in the model in chapter 6. We do not include temporal constraints in the implementation. This
is left outside the scope of the model implementation, because this requires several supporting
data stores and functional modules to be tested and verified. We also want to keep the complete
permissions inheritance, found in the role hierarchies of the NIST standard, in the model to avoid
any ambiguity.
3.4.3 Role Parametrization and Appointment Model
A model of OASIS RBAC is described by Bacon [BMY02]. Central to this approach is the idea
of credential-based role activation. The credentials that the user possesses, together with states
dependent on the environment, authorize a user to activate a set of roles. In OASIS, a role acti-
vation rule specifies the conditions that a user must meet, in order to activate a role. The OASIS
architecture models these conditions in three categories: Prerequisite roles, appointments and en-
vironmental constraints. The prerequisite roles are roles needed in order to activate another role;
appointments are a way to indirectly allocate privileges persistently through a secure persistent
capability. This is illustrated in example 9.
Example 9
If Alice, who is assigned the doctor role, asks a nurse to place an order for
drugs on her behalf (a privilege the nurse usually do not have). To enable this
type of task assignment , the security administrator could introduce a role
pharmacy nurse, who has the right to order drugs, and allow activation of
pharmacy nurse to a principal, who is acting as a nurse and who has a valid
recommendation from a doctor. Here Alice, who wishes to assign this task,
is an appointee, the recommendation is an appointment certificate, and the
nurse who accepts this recommendation is an appointee.
In OASIS, parameters may be included in the rules, that cover both role activation and access to
an object or service. Parameters may be bound to such items, as the time of a role activation,
the user id of a file owner, or an attribute of the object that is being accessed. The values that
instantiate parameters are therefore context-dependent. Example 10 illustrates how user id can
be parameter in a role. A special trait of the OASIS architecture is that it is possible to test
context predicates during role activation, as well as at the time of access.
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Example 10
If Alice activates the role doctor on duty, the activated role contains Alice’s
id as a parameter like this: doctor on duty(alice id).
The technology used in OASIS can be used both for delegation, administrative roles, constraints
and context based RBAC. In addition to this, it is possible to check both parameter values and
relationships between those values; so evaluation of role activation conditions may express ex-
ceptions by default access control.
The OASIS architecture can be used to solve many of the same problems as traditional delegation
and TRBAC solves. Parameterized roles could fundamentally change the underpinnings of the
entire role-model. In addition most of the benefits from parametrization can be provided by
traditional delegation and RBAC. It may be possible to combine the three models, but in our
view the increased complexity of such a combination would outweigh the benefits.
With this reasoning, and the time limitations for the thesis in mind, we choose to follow up on
traditional delegation and TRBAC, and leave parametrization and the OASIS architecture out of
the scope of the model we develop. We further discuss role parametrization in chapter 9.
3.5 RBAC in Healthcare
The motivation for role-based access control in healthcare information systems, is that the char-
acteristics stated in section 3.2.1 on page 10 are very close to what we find in a healthcare
organization. There are large numbers of users, relatively few security administrators, frequent
change of job responsibility and there are large numbers of data and applications to be shared. In
addition, healthcare personnel are dependent on communication with other people for perform-
ing their responsibility. This dependency is based on the others’ role, not identity. The identity is
irrelevant as long as the person concerned has the knowledge associated with the particular role.
In Norway there are three major electronic health records (EHRs) in use in hospitals [Pro03],
these are DocuLive, DIPS and Infomedix. DocuLive and DIPS use role-based access control.
Roles in DocuLive are based on profession, ward assignment and clinical rights, such as the
right to create new documents or the right to accept them. Unlike DocuLive, roles in DIPS are
based on the relations between a user and its workplace and work tasks, and a patient and its
period of care.
The discussion of how roles are used in different systems, is outside the scope of this thesis; we
only note that the concept of roles have been in use in healthcare information systems for some
time. The Norwegian EHR standard, which is reviewed in the next section, also acknowledge
roles as means for access control policies, using action and role templates.
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3.5.1 The Norwegian EHR Standard
The Norwegian EHR standard [Nys01] – Elektronisk pasientjournal standard (sic) - is developed
by KITH as part of standardization program run by the Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health.
The Norwegian EHR standard contains requirements, recommendations, and general informa-
tion models. The requirements stated are based on Norwegian laws and regulations 1 , while
recommendations based on best practice are also given. The information models are very gen-
eral with regard to specific medical cases.
The Norwegian EHR standard is being revised as we are writing this thesis, but we have received
a draft of this standard [Nys05]. Here we focus on what this new edition says about access con-
trol. The standard divides the requirements into two major groups in relation to the Norwegian
laws. These are:
• General principles, which are effective in most cases. The combination of professional
secrecy and the use of consent is the basis for the legislation.
• Exceptions. For instance when a patient, or someone entitled to act on behalf of the patient,
has required special conditions for access to recorded information. In addition, there are
emergency situations and other situations, where the required consent has to be departed.
The Norwegian EHR standard describes over one hundred different requirements for access con-
trol, which need to be taken into consideration. To quote all of these would be tedious, so instead
we present a short summary, which motivates for some of the design choices regarding the model.
It is important to note that the access control model should have a high granularity and it must
also support the many ways in which access may be granted.
Actions and Role Templates
Access is given as a consequence of a decision to bring about some action. This action must
have an expressed and valid goal. The standard specifies that the EHR must have several action
templates. Each of these action templates must clearly specify what information the action re-
quires and what information the action produces. Thus, when a healthcare worker is tasked with
performing an action, the action is entered into the EHR system, and the system automatically
grant the necessary access (least privilege),according to the action template. There is a minimum
number, required by the standard, of action templates that must exist. One of these is the per-
manent action, that allows emergency access to the record. Another is an action that gives some
roles the ability to order new actions.
Actions may be specified to be performed by a specific person or role, or the action may be
specified to be performed by any person. The action template specifies which roles and autho-
rizations are needed to perform the action and thus also the access the record components. The
1Relevant laws and regulations are [opd00], [Hd03e], [Hd03a], [Hd03c], [Hd04], [okd01], [Hd03b], [Hd03f],
[Hd03d] and [Hd02].
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standard also supports healthcare workers performing actions on behalf of another, i.e. delegated
obligation and permissions.
The standard also specifies role templates. These role templates have the right to create a new
patient record, specify who is responsible for the record, restricting access to it on behalf of
the patient, granting access on behalf of the patient and changing personal details. The person
responsible for the record of the patient, usually has full access to the contents of the record,
except when access to parts of it is restricted by the patient.
Administrative Access
Access to read and update guidelines and coding is also handled by the standard. This informa-
tion is not privileged patient information, but it must be protected from unauthorized tampering.
There may also be licensing agreements in place, limiting who gets to read the information.
Special role templates grant this access. Access for system and maintenance work must also be
granted through the access control model, without sacrificing security for expedience. System
and maintenance work should rarely require access to the records of real patients. Some role
templates also give access to change the organizational structure, and create and change role
templates, action templates and roles, and assigning healthcare workers to roles.
Time Constraints and Time Control
A user’s right to perform in a role have to has the possibility to be limited to one or more time
intervals. Actions may also be given time limits for beginning and ending, thus reducing the
timeframe for potential misuse, and reminding users/healthcare workers of actions, that have
been forgotten. For larger organizations, the standard requires the EHR system to produce reports
about actions, that have yet to be started, and about those actions that are yet to be completed.
The system must also report all emergency access, and self-approved actions possibly used to
extract information illegally.
Patient Access and Preference
The record must reflect a patient’s request to see the record, whether or not this request is ap-
proved, or whether the record is seen by the patient or somebody acting on the patient’s behalf.
The patient has a right to limit access to certain parts of the record, and may specify for which
service provider groups, roles, or specific individuals the information is available or unavailable
for. This may apply to the entire record, or just to certain topics. If the patient has given no
instruction regarding access, the general rule applies: Access is granted to the role performing
an action.
Implementation Consideration
The access control model in the Norwegian EHR standard takes this into consideration:
• Which patient the access concerns;
• Who is attempting access (role, abilities, authorizations, and unique identity);
• Which unit the patient is being treated at, and whether it’s the same unit from which the
access is attempted;
27
3 Access Control
• Why the access should be granted (actions, action templates, goals);
• What data is accessed (which components are accessed);
• What mode of access is attempted (reading, writing or changing information);
• whether or not the patient has granted special access to, or restricted certain parts of the
record.
3.6 Summary
This chapter gives a short introduction to different access control types. The chapter then focuses
on different approaches and models for role-based access control, especially the NIST standard,
which is used as the basis of the model we develop. The chapter also reviews different approaches
towards delegation and context based access control. The model in chapter 6 applies parts of the
approaches for traditional delegation and temporal RBAC. The chapter also includes a short
review of the OASIS architecture, which uses role parametrization, but this approach is omitted
due to incompatibility. The chapter finally describes how RBAC can be used in healthcare and a
review of the Norwegian EHR standard, which is very important to the work we are doing.
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Chapter 4
Information Ranking
In the repost we wrote for the specialization project, [SØ04], we tried to reason about how to rank
information. The idea is to let the system choose what kind of information a user in a particular
role would require, or at least being able to tell what the most important information to that role
is. The system is going to do this based on predefined levels of relevance and detail a particular
information object is given for a particular role. The source of our work on relevance ranking is
intelligent user interfaces.
In this chapter we first present a brief overview of intelligent user interfaces and relevance ranking
and how these two relate to one another. The concept of information ranking is then further
developed with regards to relevance and detail. The last part of this chapter is used to give a
detailed presentation of information classes and hierarchy.
4.1 Information Ranking and User Interfaces
There is a recognized problem associated with information overload and limited human mem-
ory in the healthcare industry. Therefore several different implementations of computer-based
systems, which help healthcare providers use information to make better decisions, exist. The
purpose is to improve the quality and reduce the cost of healthcare. Some of these systems
also provide decision support to the healthcare employee. The success of these systems is not
unconditional, some have ”made it” and some have not.
Although user interfaces are outside the scope of this thesis, we find it necessary to address this
topic briefly because of its importance to the application of the model we develop. The reason
for this is that having a dynamic ranking of record information could be used in the design of
intelligent user interfaces. Having data about what pieces of information are most important to
the user, the user interface can be used to only display these. The interface may allow the user the
option to also view the less important information. A key feature of intelligent user interfaces
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is that they may show a different “face” to the user, depending on which part of the working
process the user is in.
The computer systems, that would be conventionally classified as intelligent, are those that aim
to develop models of their users, i.e. the user interface has information about the users’ behavior
and acts thereafter. User modelling has traditionally analyzed the goals of an individual user, and
identified what operations the user needs to perform in the accomplishment of that goal [Kie99],
with the purpose of improving user interfaces. The concept may be expanded to also include
descriptions of human-computer interaction styles and for presenting information on computer
displays.
4.1.1 Proposed Framework for Ranking Record Information
Bayegan [Bay02] with Nytrø and Grimsmo [BØNG01], propose a framework to be used in rank-
ing record information. Decision frames are the selections of what information should be shown
at each time. Bayegan proposes classifying record information in a content ontology called
CareActType, and that each decision frame would be a selection of classes from this ontology.
Thus, after selecting a medical problem, each information object related to that problem would
be selected for display, depending on which class it belongs to. The top super-classes in the
CareActType information classification are actually not information types in themselves, but are
named by phases in the care process. By relating information classes to simple phases, the con-
tent ontology contains a choice of what information is important in what phase.
To know which particular decision frame to show, the record system needs to know the phase that
the user is in. Bayegan proposes using traces to establish process knowledge without disturbing
the user. The record system could analyze traces, action patterns, in the information that has
already been entered into the system. Trace recognition could become more advanced depending
on the quality of artificial intelligence, becoming able to recognize not just what phase of care
the user is in, but whether treatment is working and the patient is getting better. This is a difficult
task, but one that becomes simpler if we satisfy ourselves with a small number of defined phases
of care.
Another way, that the system can keep up with phases, is having the user explicitly change phase.
A common example of this is configuration wizards used when installing software applications.
4.2 Relevance and Detail Ranking
Our view of information ranking is related to decision support, but differs in the way that it does
not give any support regarding decisions. It rather sort out what information the user should
concentrate on and hide seemingly unimportant information. Similar to what is described by
Bayegan [Bay02], the information that is hidden is not unavailable to the user, unless the user
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are denied access according to the access control policy. In order to do this we have found it
necessary to expand the concept of relevance ranking to include two different parameters, namely
relevance and detail. We also modelled this concept in the specialization project, [SØ04], for a
more limited model and we now try to include this concept in a extended role-model.
4.2.1 Relevance Ranking
The relevance of information varies among the different positions and different situations in the
organization. Because we want to use the role-model to express the context of access we may
also use this to express the relevance in a particular context. This is important because relevance
ranking has to be able to answer questions such as: “To whom is what information relevant?”
And, “at what time is this relevant?”
The information is ranked with integers to have a more fine grained relevance ranking than
boolean ranking would give. Example 11 illustrates how integer control would affect the view of
information. The same approach was also used in the specialization project, [SØ04]; the differ-
ence to the extended model in this thesis is that it is more suited to rank information according
to context..
Example 11
The information of a patients allergies has different relevance level for Billy
acting in a internist role and for Ben acting in a radiologist role. Even
though both roles are senior to the doctor role and therefore have access
to patient information. The patients allergies are of a very high relevance
for the internist when performing the task of prescribing medicine. For
the radiologist this information would probably not affect the work at all,
but it can not be ignored, so it is given a lower relevance level. Using
relevance levels makes it possible to answer questions like these: What in-
formation is relevant and how relevant is it for Alice acting in a internist role?
The empirical work of investigating and make suggestions for the relevance of different infor-
mation is outside the scope of this thesis, but we use the scenario to make our own guesses and
test the role-model according to this. Relevance is the measure of how crucial the information is
and what information is most likely to be needed for the particular role. Every role defined in the
role set is given a particular relevance ranking for every information class see, 4.2.3. Because a
user can activate multiple roles in one session, also referred to as the functional role of the user,
relevance and detail are ranked according to several roles. Just like permissions are assigned to
roles, relevance and detail are assigned to roles as shown i figure 4.1. The concept of relevance
ranking is formally defined in the role-model in chapter 6.
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Figure 4.1: Relevance and detail in relation to roles and permissions
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4.2.2 Detail Ranking
Detail ranking has similar properties as relevance ranking, but detail ranking differs in that it
tries to measure the voluminously of the information that should be presented. Detail ranking is
therefore an important mechanism of ”hiding” information. This allows the user to have different
views of the information. Example 12 illustrates what we mean by different detail levels and how
we can make use of this.
Example 12
It may be sufficient for a nurse to know that a patient has received medication,
but if needed, the nurse can further investigate what kind of medication and
the dosage. The doctor treating the patient, may be interested in the type and
dosage of the drugs without having to ”investigate” further.
Using detail levels make it possible to answer questions like these: Given the
patient Elisa, at what detail levels does Alice see Elisa’s information objects;
and at what detail level does Bob see those objects?
The detail level is also ranked with integers. Here, as with relevance ranking, an important
extension from the earlier work we have done is the possibility to do a more precise detail ranking
of information in relation to the context.
4.2.3 Information Classes and Hierarchy
We stated in the specialization project, [SØ04], that it is necessary to put objects into information
classes to allow for effective ranking of information. These classes can be put into hierarchies
for even more effective ranking. Figure 4.2 shows information classes that are put in different
hierarchies. Each object is related to at least one information class. An example of how a
hierarchy of information classes might look like is given in figure 4.3. Note that the inheritance
is top down with the most general information class in top of the hierarchy.
An object is, as mentioned in section 3.3.1 on page 12, an entity that contains or receives infor-
mation. This can for instance be files or directories in an operating system or columns, rows,
tables or views in a DBMS. It can also be some other system resource, like printers, disk space
or CPU cycles. In general the set of objects that are covered by a RBAC, are all objects listed
in the permissions assigned to roles. When we discuss objects in relation with an information
class, treat objects as pieces of information about patients. This is because the main purpose of
the model is to regulate access to record information. We have not found it relevant to describe
the model used for access control to other types of objects. Also, the Norwegian EHR standard
[Nys05] does not consider access to anything but information components and uses the term EPJ
fragment to describe the smallest possible piece of stored information. Thus, in the model we
develop objects are equal to EHR fragments.
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Figure 4.2: Information, information classes and info-objects
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4.3 Summary
The use of information classes are similar to the classifying of record information done by
Bayegan, [Bay02]. It is also stated by Guan [Gua04] as an practical mean to provide permis-
sion on classes of information, instead of single objects. Modelling of patient data is also well
known from decision support systems, where the patient information model is concerned with
the representation of patient data and its mapping to institutional electronic medical record data
models. A difference here is that all we are concerned with, is the administration and implemen-
tation benefits from having a hierarchy and not the exact representation of the data.
Classifying objects in information classes and putting these classes in hierarchies provide the
practical mean to present information with the correct permission, relevance and detail. We have
illustrated this in example 13.
Example 13
A secretary, unless delegated some responsibility, may only access a patient
personalia, thus access need to be denied for every other information class. In
the hierarchy in figure 4.3 denying the secretary access to the ”Medical His-
tory” automatically deny the secretary access to the junior class ”Treatment”.
For a doctor having the relevance level ranked for the class ”Test Data” all
the classes junior to ”TestData” are ranked with at least the same value.
4.3 Summary
This chapter includes two major parts, both relating to information ranking. The first part consid-
ers information ranking in relation with user interfaces. Although user interfaces is outside of the
scope of this thesis this is included because it is an application of information ranking. The chap-
ter also includes a short review of the work of Bayegan with Nytrø and Grimsmo, [BØNG01].
The framework they present to use for ranking relevance of record information, is part of the
motivation for this thesis. The second part of this chapter is used to explain how we want to
use information ranking in the model we develop. In particular we describe how information
can be ranked both as relevance and detail. The chapter also introduces information classes and
information hierarchies, which are very important to make administration of access control and
information ranking efficient.
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Figure 4.3: Example hierarchy
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Chapter 5
Prerequisites for the Model
In this chapter we present a scenario from a healthcare organization. The central point to this
scenario is what information is most important to whom, and what information is to be kept
confidential. The scenario is important to test and validate the model. As already indicated in
this thesis RBAC is useful in a healthcare organization and the scenario is used to support this
indication. From the scenario we derive the general requirements for a RBAC model, that is used
in a healthcare organization. The scenario is partially based on a scenario described by Thomas
[Tho97], but is further developed to meet this thesis requirements and match the examples given
earlier. It involves several different actors with different roles in the care process, thus the actors
have different goals and information needs. These goals and information needs are described for
each actor, but we note that this is done according to our own beliefs for the purpose of making
the model. The scenario is not based on interviews of healthcare personnel or other empirical
research. Making the rules and hierarchies, that are useful and correct for specific users, is not a
part of this thesis.
In the second part of this chapter we present the requirements, that set constraints on how we are
supposed to build the role-model. These requirements help identify what the model is supposed
to demonstrate and how it is supposed to demonstrate it.
5.1 An Illustrative Scenario
This patient is a 28 year old female named Elisa. She suffers from diabetes mellitus and hy-
pertension. For these conditions she is prescribed with insulin, a beta blocker, and a thiazide.
Elisa is brought to the hospital and requires acute medical attention for hypoglycemia. At the
hospital the scenario starts out with a visit to the emergency room (ER). At the ER the patient
is quickly screened by an intern, who determines that the patient needs to be admitted to the
internal medicine ward. The intern that admitted the patient, subsequently prescribes a medicine
to stabilize the blood sugar, and in addition requests a CT, because the patient has suffered from
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a head trauma when passing out because of the hypoglycemia. The internist, who is consulted at
the internal medical ward, decides to prescribe a new dosage of insulin. The insulin is delivered
by a nurse, who also keeps track of the blood sugar and blood pressure of Elisa. After being
stabilized, Elisa is sent to radiology for CT and then returned to the medical ward. During the
night the patient suffers a heart attack. She is immediately transferred to the cardiology unit,
where a cardiology team undertake the care of the patient. When the patient’s heart condition is
stabilized, the patient is transferred back to the medical ward. After spending a few more days in
the hospital, the patient recovers, is discharged, and is told to see his/her primary care doctor for
follow-up care. The discharge paper is dictated and signed by one of the involved doctors, but is
written by a secretary and is counter signed by a senior resident.
5.1.1 Actors and Information Requirements
An important aspect of role-based access control is the identification of roles with belonging
access permissions. This process, called role engineering [Coy96], depends on thorough organi-
zational knowledge and specific work flow understanding. Though role engineering is important
to system design, it is not a major focus of this thesis. Instead we solve this by identifying the
roles that actually are in the scenario and make a very short description of their responsibilities,
access privileges and information needs in the current situation. We note that this description is
NOT based on medical experience.
For any given situation each user may activate several different roles, just like in this scenario.
Thus, in order to have the access privileges and information ranking described here, there is a
need for information regarding the context. The information about the context can be expressed
as roles that the user can activate. Thus, the roles the users have activated are in reality in-
tern on call at ER, nurse at medical ward and so on. For simplicity we have not done this here,
but in chapter 8 the role activation with several roles is done.
Patient (Elisa) Is the ”owner” of the information about herself.
Intern (Roger) Is the first in contact with the patient. He needs to do a screening of Elisa and
decide on the appropriate action. He needs the medical history of the patient, but is denied
access to certain information such as psychiatric information. Important information is
current medical conditions and medication.
Internist (Billy) Is contacted after the first screening and is interested in the blood pressure and
blood sugar levels in particular and also need to be informed about current medication.
Nurse (Betty) It may be sufficient for a nurse to know that Elisa has received insulin. If Elisa
hasn’t received her insulin, the nurse also needs to know the correct dosage in order to
prescribe Elisa the insulin.
Radiologist (Ben) Has to perform a CT on the patient, but only needs information regarding the
head trauma the patient is suffering from. He later has to examine the CT image.
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Cardiologist (Alice) She needs information about all patient allergies, medical conditions and
medications to get a overview of the situation.
Secretary (Bob) Writes the discharge papers and is therefore delegated permissions to view all
information regarding Elisa’s stay at the hospital. These permissions are delegated from
the doctor dictating the discharge papers .
5.1.2 General Requirements
We notice the following about this scenario:
• A number of clinical staff (users) are involved in various roles in providing care at various
points in the care process. These include interns, internists, cardiologists, nurses, etc.
• The staff is associated with different wards in the organization.
• Staff members that are providing care, are often dynamically put into the care process.
For access control and information ranking in particular, we notice the following requirements:
General Requirement 1 (Role in care). As already anticipated the permissions a clinical staff
member has to clinical records (documents) should reflect the staff member’s role in providing
care.
General Requirement 2 (Treating patient). Only staff members that actually treat the patient
should be able to get access to the patient’s records.
General Requirement 3 (Changing wards). Depending on the care process, various clinical
staff members need access to patient records at different points in the overall process. Therefore,
when a patient is transferred to a new ward, the staff members at the new ward should only be
given access to the patient’s information after the staff at the old ward has requested the transfer.
General Requirement 4 (Joining the care process). Requirements 1 and 2 above should hold
for any staff member who dynamically joins the care process.
General Requirement 5 (Delegate). Certain staff members may delegate duties and associated
permissions to other staff members.
General Requirement 6 (Discharge). Once the patient is discharged, all permissions to the
patient’s medical records should be deactivated.
The model can be developed to meet these requirements, but needs some extensions from an
ordinary RBAC model. If we look at the requirements one by one we notice the following:
Requirement 1 clearly calls for RBAC and can indeed be handled by RBAC in a straightforward
manner. The exact nature of permissions in the model, presented in chapter 6, have certain
ramifications. In other words, are permissions specified on classes (types) of objects, or
are they specified on individual objects?
Requirement 2 cannot be met completely by a basic RBAC model. If we examine this require-
ment closely, we see that it has three parts:
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2.1 The type of permissions allowed to a staff member should be determined by their
role.
2.2 Permissions should be restricted to individual user instances of roles treating a spe-
cific patient
2.3 Permissions should be restricted to specific instances of objects (records) that pertain
to a specific patient.
These three requirements call for access control to be specified at a much finer level than
ordinary RBAC. They require access control on individual users and object instances. We
note that RBAC, with roles being assigned permissions to individual object instances, can
meet requirement 2.1 in isolation. Specifying permissions at this level add to security
administration overhead, and possibly confusion and error, which is precisely the problem
RBAC is trying to avoid. In summary, requirement 2 calls for a hybrid model of access
control that incorporates aspects of RBAC, as well as user identity and object-based access
control. In other words, we want RBAC-based permission assignment on object types at
an enterprise level, and yet able to activate and control permissions on individual users and
object instances at a more detailed level of administration.
Requirement 3 calls for permission activation to progress from staff members in one ward to
staff members in another for a specific patient.
Requirement 5 calls for the ability to delegate a permission to a specific instance of a role. This
essentially means that a permission needs to be assigned and activated for the role instance.
We note that it is a problem relating to delegation that permissions cannot be delegated to
roles, because doing so give additional permission to all instances of the role. Instead roles
need to be delegated to users that may not be assigned to such a role, and in addition such
a delegation should only include one specific patient.
Requirement 6 calls for deactivation of all permissions that various staff members may hold on
a patient’s record. This implies that users have their assigned roles deactivated.
In summary, the above scenario require role-based permission assignment for users and informa-
tion classes, and activation of permissions for individual users and object instances.
5.2 Model Requirements
The scenario revealed some requirements for a role-model to be used in a healthcare organization,
but still there is a lot of options to comply with these requirements. We have therefore sorted
out a set of requirements that place a greater limitations on the development of the model. We
note that the requirements listed are not supposed to be requirements viewed as system specific
requirements. The requirements are instead to be seen as design choices, constraints on the
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surrounding and on what the model has to represent. At the end these requirements also help us
validate the model.
The first and most important model requirement is that the model we develop is built with a
formal logic. This is done using the formal language LDA described in chapter 2. Having the
model built with a formal language helps us test and validate it. This requirement is given in
table 5.1.
Name Formal language
Description The model shall be described in a formal language
that is able to express deontic logic.
Goal When expressed in a formal language the model can
be tested and validated accordingly.
Table 5.1: Formal language
5.2.1 The Components Required
The second model requirement we set for the model is that it shall be based on the NIST standard
for RBAC. This is because the NIST standard is regarded as authoritative work on role-based
access control and we like the model we develop to be compatible with this standard. The core
elements are natural to include, when we are to follow the NIST standard. In accordance with
the needs in the healthcare sector, which have multiple roles and many of them have similarities,
hierarchical RBAC is included. The need for setting constraints on role assignment and on role
activation is an argument for both static and dynamic separation of duty constraints. These model
requirements related to the NIST standard are listed in table 5.2.
Name NIST standard components
Description Using the NIST standard as a starting point, we in-
clude:
1. The core RBAC elements
2. Hierarchical RBAC component
3. Static separation duty
4. Dynamic separation of duty
Goal The model is compatible with a known RBAC stan-
dard.
Table 5.2: NIST standard components
Various tasks in healthcare can be delegated, and these tasks are therefore carried out on behalf
of someone. Accordingly the model must handle delegation. To be more precise the model
have to determine the transitivity of delegation, what can be delegated and who may receive
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delegation. The model also have to determine what happen to the permissions of the receiver
of a delegation and what happen to the permissions of the delegator. Table 5.3 and 5.4 list the
model requirements needed for delegation in the model.
Name Delegation
Description The model must give the opportunity for perform-
ing task on behalf of another user, and authorizing
another user to perform tasks on one’s behalf. The
model shall formally define:
1. Transitivity of delegation
2. Completeness of delegation
3. Permanence of delegation
Goal The model shall support the delegation that occur in a
healthcare organization.
Table 5.3: Delegation
Name Delegation of role units
Description Users may only want to delegate certain permissions
to other users and not permissions of the entire role.
Goal The model must give the opportunity to delegate a
smaller atomic unit than a role.
Table 5.4: Delegation of role units
The access to and ranking of information in a healthcare organization is heavily dependent upon
the context of the access and ranking. Important to this context is the location and the time.
This can be expressed as roles such as on duty and ward B. To express constraints on the time
dependent roles we need to be able to express a period of time. It is also necessary to be able to
change the context during run-time, such as revoking access right, because the patient is trans-
ferred to another ward, and therefore need a formalization of a run-time expression. The two
model requirements listed in table 5.5 and 5.6 cover the model requirements for periodic time
and run-time request.
Name Periodic time
Description In order to achieve access and information ranking
based on the context of time we need the model to
support periodic expressions.
Goal Periodic time is formalized in the model.
Table 5.5: Periodic time
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Name Run-time requests
Description Dynamic changes occur in healthcare and these
changes need to be reflected in the model.
Goal Run-time requests make it possible to change a given
context, thus changing access privileges and informa-
tion ranking.
Table 5.6: Run-time requests
5.2.2 Information Ranking Requirements
To allow for information ranking there are a few model requirements. First of all when having
both delegation and time expressions added to the NIST standard, there has to be added only
two additional components in the model. These two components, which are relevance and detail,
have to be defined similar to permission. Relevance and detail ranking should be based on the
same policy that grants and denies access. This is because it is important that the ranking of
information has to be done without any extra input from the user, only relying on information al-
ready entered into the EHR system. Table 5.7 covers the model requirement for adding relevance
and detail.
Name Information ranking components
Description We need to include relevance and detail components
to support information ranking.
Goal The model is made to support information ranking
based on the information used for access control.
Table 5.7: Information ranking components
For both access control and information ranking, we need an efficient way to give access to and
rank relevance and detail for a particular object. We believe information classes and information
hierarchies are helpful in this regard. Table 5.8 covers the model requirement for information
classes and information hierarchies.
Name Information classes and hierarchy
Description Information can be put into classes that can be placed
in hierarchy. This is a way of modelling patient data
in order to make administration of the security policy
Goal The model is made to support information classes and
information hierarchy.
Table 5.8: Information classes and hierarchy
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5.2.3 Activation Functions
Roles are activated for users, either explicitly by themselves or implicitly by a system observing
their authentication, location, work flow, or other context. Since several roles may be activated
in the same session, the model must act deterministically when giving the user permissions and
ranking information. This requirement is found in table 5.9. If this is not required, the infor-
mation ranking and permissions available to a user with more than one activated role is inde-
terminate. Without studying the implementation code, there is no way of knowing whether the
resulting ranking and permissions are a sum, difference, minimum, maximum, random, or other
value from the corresponding ranking and permissions in the roles. Implementations of the same
model should not vary from each other on this point. If a different behavior when combining
roles is desired, this should be clearly defined in the model prior to implementation. Alterna-
tively, various behavior could be part of the same implementation, and chosen by configuration.
Table 5.10 covers the model requirement for having a function, that evaluates which roles may
be activated. This function enforces the separation of duty and time constraints on access. In
addition, the function evaluates the type of authorization given, i.e. read, update etc., and the
ranking given each role.
The last model requirement is that patients may deny or extend access to the whole or part of
the record for one or several healthcare employees, by identity, profession, or other criteria. If
the patient denies access to someone it overrules everything else. This model requirement is
covered in table 5.11. Without going into detail about other access control mechanisms we find
it necessary to use an access control list to support this model requirement. An access control
list may be used to revoke access from particular users that the patient has denied access instead
of specifying which user has access to which patient. The latter design introduces a security
administration overhead, which is precisely the problem RBAC is trying to avoid.
Name Combining ranking and access from several roles
Description Because users may activate several roles the model
needs to evaluate how these roles behave in combina-
tion with each other.
Goal To make a function in pseudo code that evaluates ac-
cess and ranking for a user, which has activated a set
of roles.
Table 5.9: Combining ranking and access from several roles
44
5.2 Model Requirements
Name Legal role activation
Description Because users may activate several roles the model
needs to express how the roles can be activated by a
user in a way that makes sure no constraints are bro-
ken.
Goal Express a role construction function in pseudo code.
Table 5.10: Legal role activation
Name Patient preference
Description Patients may deny specific users from accessing the
patient record, and extend access to others; thus the
model have to express this, but at the same time avoid
unnecessary security administration overhead.
Goal An access control list is used to revoke access from
particular users, that the patient has denied access.
Table 5.11: Patient preference
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5.3 Summary
This chapter describes a scenario, which is used in chapter 8 to test the model. The scenario in-
cludes a general description of the actors, which is important when we test the model. From the
scenario we derived some general requirements for an access control model. These requirements
are complementary to the research goals on page 1 and the motivation for using RBAC in health-
care on page 25. The second part of this chapter is used to describe requirement for the model,
that place a greater limitations on the development. These requirements are not system specific
requirements. They are instead to be seen as design choices, constraints on the surrounding and
on what the model has to represent.
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Chapter 6
Model
In this chapter we present the model that we have developed based on the theories presented
in the preceding chapters. The first section of the chapter is used to give an overview of the
model. The following sections express the formal model. The last sections describes the role
construction function and the access-ranking function for the model.
6.1 Model overview
To show how the different parts of the model fit into each other, we use a simple diagram. Figure
6.1 shows this diagram. It is a new version of the diagram in the specialization project [SØ04, p.
50].
The basic definitions are presented in section 6.2. These definitions, based on the NIST standard
[FSG+01], are used in the other parts of the model.
Several other parts of the model come from the NIST standard. The model therefore supports role
hierarchies (section 6.4), static separation of duty and dynamic separation of duty (SoD, section
6.5). This basic model is extended with the notion of information classes (6.3) and information
ranking. In addition, the model is designed to support delegation (6.6) and context based RBAC.
These additional extensions are based on the work described in section 3.4.
Section 6.7 contains the temporal definitions. Access rules defined in section 6.8 include the
general rules for granting access to roles, as well as the rules that are used when patients want to
deny or extend access to their personal information.
Role combination and Ranking and access control, marked with a darker background in figure
6.1, are the central components of our model. Section 6.9 contains the role construction function
and the ranking and granting function. Additive methods, methods using sources of relevance
information external to the role rules, are commented in section 6.10.
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Figure 6.1: Model architecture
In the formal definitions, we have highlighted our own work like this: to separate that from
the work done by others. There is no such highlighting of the functions (role construction and
ranking), as they are entirely designed by us.
6.2 The Basic Definitions
The role-model is made from the basic sets defined in the NIST standard, but in addition the
basic model includes both relevance ranking and detail ranking.
Basic sets:
The basic sets similar to the NIST standard.
• U = a set of users, {u1, . . . , ui}
• OBJ = a set of information objects, {obj1, . . . , objj}
• OP = a set of operations, {op1, . . . , opk}
• ROLES = a set of roles, {r1, . . . , ri}
• SESSIONS = a set of sessions, {s1, . . . , sr}
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The two basic sets that we have included to support information ranking are:
• REL = a set of relevance levels, {rel1, . . . , reli}
• DEL = a set of detail levels, {del1, . . . , deli}
As mentioned in section 4.2.3, page 33, objects in the model are EHR fragments or collections
thereof.
Basic Relations:
The relation and mapping between the basic sets. First we present the NIST standard, which
already now has to be extended to handle delegation, this is because of the need to separate
between original user-to role assignment relation and delegated user-to-role assignment relation.
• UAO ⊆ USERS × ROLES a many to many mapping original user-to-role assignment
relation
• UAD ⊆ USERS×ROLES a many to many mapping delegated user-to-role assignment
relation
• UA = UAO ∪ UAD the union of original and delegated user-to-role assignment relation
• assigned users : (r : ROLES) → 2USERS , the mapping of role r onto a set of users.
Formally: assigned users(r) = {u ∈ USERS|(u, r) ∈ UA}.
• PRMS = 2OP×OBJset of permissions.
• PA ⊆ PRMS ×ROLES, a many to many mapping permission-to-role assignment rela-
tion.
• assigned permissions(r : ROLES) → 2PRMS , the mapping of role r onto a set of per-
missions. Formally: assigned permissions(r) = {p ∈ PRMS|(p, r) ∈ PA}
• OB(p : PRMS) → op ⊆ OPS, the permission to operation mapping, which gives the
set of operations associated with permission p.
• OB(p : PRMS)→ ob ⊆ OBJ , the permission to object mapping, which gives the set of
objects associated with permission p.
• user sessions(u : USERS)→ 2SESSIONS , the mapping of users u onto a set of sessions.
• session roles(s : SESSIONS) → 2ROLES , the mapping of session s onto a set of roles.
Formally: session roles(si) ⊆ r ∈ ROLES|(session(si), r) ∈ UA.
• avail session perms(s : SESSEIONS) → 2PRMS , the permissions available to a user
in a session,
S
r∈session roles(s)assigned permissions(r).
The basic relations and mapping for relevance are:
• RRMS = 2REL×OBJ set of relevances.
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• RA ⊆ RRMS ×ROLES, a many to many mapping relevance-to-role assignment rela-
tion.
• assigned relevance(r : ROLES)→ 2RRMS , the mapping of role r onto a set of relevance.
Formally: assigned relevance(r) = {p ∈ RRMS|(p, r) ∈ RA}
• OB(rr : RRMS)→ rel ⊆ REL, the RRMS to relevance mapping, which gives the set
of relevance associated with RRMS rr.
• OB(rr : RRMS)→ ob ⊆ OBJ , the RRMS to object mapping, which gives the set of
objects associated with RRMS rr.
• avail session perms(s : SESSEIONS)→ 2RRMS , the relevance for a user in a session,S
r∈session roles(s) assigned relevance(r).
The basic relations and mapping for detail are:
• DRMS = 2DEL×OBJ set of details.
• DA ⊆ DRMS ×ROLES, a many to many mapping detail-to-role assignment relation.
• assigned detail(r : ROLES)→ 2DRMS , the mapping of role r onto a set of detail. For-
mally: assigned detail(r) = {p ∈ DRMS|(p, r) ∈ DA}
• OB(dd : DRMS)→ det ⊆ DET , the DRMS to detail mapping, which gives the set of
detail associated with DRMS dd.
• OB(dd : DRMS)→ ob ⊆ OBJ , the DDMS to object mapping, which gives the set of
objects associated with detail dd.
• avail session perms(s : SESSEIONS)→ 2DRMS , the detail for a user in a session,S
r∈session roles(s) assigned detail(r).
6.3 Information Classes
In the definitions for information ranking we have included definitions for information classes
and the information class hierarchy, in order to make implementations for larger organizations
possible. The information classes define a general hierarchy; a limited hierarchy is not defined in
this role-model. Each information object is a member of an information class and these classes
form a hierarchy.
• CLASSES = a set of information classes for the objects, {class1, . . . , classo}
• CH ⊆ CLASSES × CLASSES, is a partial order on classes called the class inheritance
relation, called a information classification hierarchy or class hierarchy, written as CH ,
where class1 CH class2 means that class1 is either one of the ancestors of class2, or that
class1 = class2
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• CA ⊆ OBJ × CLASSES, a many-to-one mapping object-to-class assignment relation.
An object has only one class.
• instanceof(obj ∈ OBJ)→ CLASSES, the mapping of object obj onto a single class.
Formally: instanceof(obj) = {class ∈ CLASSES | (obj, class) ∈ CA}
6.4 Role Definitions and Role Hierarchy
In section 6.2 we have defined the set of roles according to the NIST standard. In addition we
want to define two other concepts regarding roles. The concept of a role unit is needed to deal
with delegation of smaller units than a role. Thus a role unit is a subset of the obligation and
permission given a role. The concept of a functional role are used when evaluating the total
permission space, relevance and detail ranking for user. The functional role is defined as the set
of roles and role units the user has activated in a particular session.
• Role unit is a set of obligation and permissions.
role unit(r ∈ ROLES)→ PRMS ×RRMS ×DRMS Formally:
role unit(r) = {p2, rr2, d2)|r = (p1, rr1, d1), p1 ⊆ PRMS, rr1 ⊆ RRMS,
d1 ⊆ DRMS, p2 ⊆ p1, rr2 ⊆ rr1, d1 ⊆ d2, r ⊆ ROLES}
• A functional role is the set of roles that a user has activated in a particular session and
therefore describes the permission the user have in that session.
fur(role list : ROLES)→ ROLES × PRMS ×RRMS ×DRMS Formally:
fur(r) = {(role list, priva, rrmsa, drmsa)|role list ∈ ROLES ,priva ∈ PRMS,
rrmsa ∈ RRMS ,drmsa ∈ DRMS}
The Role Hierarchy Definitions We have chosen to include general role hierarchies, which
allow for multiple inheritance. We believe we don’t have to limit the inheritance for the role
hierarchies, therefore we do not define inheritance limitations in the model. The  relation is
subscripted to differentiated role hierarchy from information class hierarchy.
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, is a partial order on ROLES called the class inheritance
relation, written as RH , where r1 RH r2 means that r1 is either one of the ancestors of
r2, or that r1 = r2
• authorized users(r : ROLES) → 2USERS , the mapping of role r onto a set of users
in the presence of a role hierarchy. Formally: authorized users(r) = {u ∈ USERS|
r′ RH r(u, r′) ∈ UA}.
• authorized permissions(r : ROLES) → 2PRMS , the mapping of role r onto a set of
permissions in the presence of a role hierarchy. Formally: authorized permissions(r) =
{p ∈ PRMS| r′ RH r(p, r′) ∈ PA}.
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6.5 Separation of Duty
The NIST standard includes both static and dynamic separation of duty, we found both of these
types of SoD useful for the model and therefore define both.
Static Separation of Duty Rules and Definitions:
To enforce separation of duty rules in a static context we use SSD rules. The NIST standard
provides definitions for static separation of duty. We include this in the model despite of the fact
that most, but not all, constraints in healthcare applications are probably dynamic.
• SSD ⊆ (2ROLES × N) is a collection of pairs(rs, n) in static separation of Duty, where
each rs is a role set, t is a subset of roles in rs, and n is a natural number ≥ 2, with the
property that no user is assigned to n or more roles from the set rs in each (rs, n) ∈ SSD.
Formally: ∀(rs, n) ∈ SSD,∀t ⊆ rs : |t| ≥ n⇒ ∩r∈tassigned users(r) = ∅
• in the presence of a role hierarchy the static separation of duty needs a redefinition to
formally: ∀(rs, n) ∈ SSD,∀t ⊆ rs : |t| ≥ n⇒ Tr∈tauthorized users(r) = ∅
Dynamic Separation of Duty Rules and Definitions:
Dynamic separation of duty constraints is as mentioned in 3.3.3 are constraints placed on the
roles activated within or across a user’s session. Dynamic separation of duty provides extended
support for the principle of least privilege in that at user may have different levels of permissions
at different times. Because dynamic separation of duty relations are constraints on the roles that
are activated in a user’s session, it does not differ in the presence of a role hierarchy.
• DSD ⊆ 2ROLES × N is collection of pairs (rs, n) in Dynamic Separation of duty, where
each rs is a role set and n is a natural number ≥ 2, with the property that no subject may
activate n or more roles from the set rs in each dsd ∈ DSD. Formally:
∀rs ∈ 2ROLES, n ∈ N, (rs, n) ∈ DSD ⇒ n ≥ 2 ∧ |rs| ≥ n, and ∀s ∈ SESSIONS,
∀rs ∈ 2ROLES,∀role subset ∈ 2ROLES,∀n ∈ N, (rs, n) ∈ DSD, role subset ⊆ rs,
role subset ⊆ session roles(s)⇒ |role subset| < n.
6.6 RBAC Delegation Relations and Functions
We repeat from section 6.2 that UAO is a many to many mapping between original user-to-role
assignment relation, UAD is a many to many mapping between original user-to-role assignment
relation, and UA = UAO ∪ UAD. We use this to define the delegation relation.
The delegation relation in the model have to be defined for both original user delegation rela-
tion and the delegated user relation. These two relation together form the delegation relation.
Formally:
• DLGT ⊆ UA× UA = U ×R× U ×R is a many to one delegation relation
• ODLGT ⊆ UAO × UAD is an original user delegation relation
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• DDLGT ⊆ UAD × UAD is a delegated user delegation relation
• DLGT = ODLGT ∪DDLGT
In section 3.4.1 we mentioned that there are several characteristics related to delegation. one
of these characteristics is transitivity. The function Prior maps each user to role assignment to
another user to role assignment (or possibly an empty set). The function Path determines the
path of delegated user-role assignment. The function Depth is a simple function that determines
the number of elements in the delegation path. Together the three functions Prior, Path and
Depth are used to formalize the depth of transitive delegation.
• Prior : U ∪R→ U ×R is a function that maps each UA to another UA or ∅
Prior(u, r) = {(u′, r′)|(u, r) ∈ UAD, (u′, r′, u, r) ∈ DLGT}
Prior(u, r) = {∅|(u, r) ∈ UAO}
• A delegation path is a set of ordered user-role assignment
Path(u0, r0) = {(u0, ro), (u1, r1), . . . , (ui, ri), . . . , (un, rn)|(ui, ri) = Prior(ui−1, ri−1) ∈
UA when i > 0}
Path(u, r) = {∅|(u, r) ∈ UAO}
• Depth : U ∪ R → N . A delegation depth is the number of elements in a delegation path
minus one
Depth(u, r) = {n|n = |Path(u, r)|, (u, r) ∈ UAD}
Depth(u, r) = {0|(u, r) ∈ UAO}
In addition to transitivity the model take into account what may be delegated, who may receive
delegation, how the receiver should respond to delegation and the transfer of responsibilities.
These formal definition place restrictions on how delegation may take place, but we believe they
are according to the Norwegian EHR standard.
• A holder of a role may only delegate obligation or permissions that is part of his/her own
functional role. Formally:
Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3)→ r3 ≤ r1
• Any user within the organization can receive any delegation rights as long as it does not
interfere with the separation of duty constraints. Formally:
Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3)→ (r2, r3) /∈ dsd ∩ (r2, r3) /∈ ssd
• A user receiving obligation or permissions adds this role unit to his/her functional role.
Formally:
Delegatec(x : r1, y : r2, r3)
def
= is− r2 + r3(y) ∧ . . .
• The user who delegates obligations or permission still continues to have the same obliga-
tions and permissions. Formally:
Delegate(x : r1, y : r2, r3)
def
= is− r2 + r3(y) ∧ r3 : REP (x : r1, ∗)
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When introducing delegation we also need delegation revocation. Different types of revocation
are discussed in section 3.4.1, but here we only allow the user who have delegated the permissions
to revoke them, known as grant-dependant revocation. We do this because we belive this is
the common practice in a healthcare organization. This revocation also have to be cascading,
meaning that if the delegated role or role unit is further delegated it is revoked here as well.
• Revoke(x : r1, y : r2, r3, ) def= is− r2(y) ∧ is not− r3(y)
6.7 Temporal RBAC Rules and Definitions
An important aspect with this extension is the need for the model to represent different respon-
sibilities and needs at different times. This implies that we have to be able to specify different
activation times. We do this by formalizing periodic expression and run-time request as de-
scribed in 3.4.2. We make this extension as simple as possible to avoid unnecessary complexity
and ambiguity.
We include periodic expressions from [BBF01] in the model. These definitions are a calendar
expression, which is defined as a countable set of contiguous intervals, and periodic expression,
which combines calendar expression to express more general periodic expressions. In addition
the function Π() denotes the infinite time instants corresponding to a periodic expression, and
the function Sol() define the set of time instants denoted by < [begin, end], P >. These three
functions allow us to place some temporal constraints on user-role activation.
Periodic expression Given calendars Cd, C1, . . . , Cn, a periodic expression P can be defined
as: P =
∑n
i=1Qi.Ci B x.Cd.
where Q1 = all, Qi ∈ 2N ∪ {all}, Ci ⊆ Ci−1 for i = 2, . . . , n, Cd ⊆ Cn, and x ∈ N.
Example: all.Years + {3, 7}.Months B2. Months represent the set of intervals starting at
the same instant as the third and seventh month every year and having a duration of two
months.
Function Π() Let P =
∑n
i=1Qi.Ci B x.Cd be a periodic expression, then Π(P ) is a set of time
intervals whose common duration is Cd, and whose set S of starting points is computed as
follows:
• If n = 1, S contains all the starting points of the intervals of calendar C1
• If n > 1, and Qn = n1, . . . , nk, then S contains the starting points of the nth1 , . . . , nthk
intervals (all intervals if Qn = all) of calendar Cn included in each interval of
Π(
∑n
i=1Qi.Ci B 1.Cn−1.
Function Sol() Let t be a time instant , P a periodic expression, ,and begin and end two date
expression. Define t ∈ Sol([begin, end], P ) iff there exists τ ∈ Π(P ) such that t ∈ τ, tb ≤
t ≤ te are the instants denoted by begin and end, respectively.
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In addition we include run-time requests in the model. The motivation to include run-time re-
quests is requirement K7.41 in the Norwegian EHR standard, [Nys05], which specifically states
that it should be possible to limit a person’s right to act in a role to one or several time intervals.
This implies that a role may be deactivated after a while. In addition run-time request allow for
context changes for instance when a patient are moved from one ward to another.
• a user’s run-time request expression to activate a role has the form: s : activate r for u
after 4t, or s : deactivate r for u after 4t where r ∈ ROLES and u ∈ USERS , s is
the session attached to the request and4t is the duration.
• an administrator’s run-time request expression has the form: pr : E after4t where pr : E
is a prioritized event expression and4t is the duration expression
6.8 Access Rules
The model developed so far supports basic functions such as separation of duties and also sup-
ports delegation, temporal constraints and some context dependency. The model still lacks rules
for ranking and access in roles; it also lacks the ability to deny particular users access to patient
information based on this patient’s request. To support this we include an access control list in
the model. The definitions for this is found in section 6.8.2.
In order to include the patient access control list, we first need to define various rules for permis-
sions, relevance and detail.
6.8.1 Rules in Roles
The functional role is given access rights and a relevance and detail ranking based on some
general principles. We make these granting and ranking rules and functions partially independent
of each other. This meaning that the rules and functions for each of access, relevance and detail
are given as separate rules.
We also define a triplet of privilege, relevance and detail, called an access-ranking, which sup-
ports the patient access control list and the ranking and granting function. A privilege is simply
a set of operations. Finally, we define a set of rules for how objects should be given an access-
ranking.
Access control
Each object belonging to a particular class has a set of rules for how it should be given permis-
sions:
• PRIV ⊆ OP , is a set of privileges. Each privilege can contain from none to all operations.
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• PRULES ⊆ PRIV × CLASSES, is a set of rules for how an object belonging to a
particular information class should be given permission.
Ranking
Each object belonging to a particular class has a set of rules of how it should be given a relevance
and detail ranking:
• RRULES ⊆ REL× CLASSES, is a set of rules for how an object belonging to a par-
ticular information class should be given relevance level.
• DRULES ⊆ DEL× CLASSES, is a set of rules for how an object belonging to a par-
ticular information class should be given detail level.
Accrank and crule
Relevance, detail and privilege together form a triplet we have called an access-ranking
(ACCRANK) which consists of relevance, detail and privilege (list of operations) for a partic-
ular rule. Using this triplet, we can make a construction rule (CRULES). A construction rule
can be split into a PRULE, RRULE and DRULE.
• ACCRANKS ⊆ REL×DEL× PRIV , a set of access and rankings, each accrank
consists of privilege (list of operations), one relevance level and one detail level.
• CRULES ⊆ ACCRANKS × CLASSES, is a set of rules for how an object belonging
to a particular information class should be given an ACCRANK.
6.8.2 Rules for Patient’s Preferences
As we have stated in table 5.11, the model needs to reflect a patient’s preferences, for denying
particular users access to his/her record information, and also to grant additional access to par-
ticular users. Thus the model needs to support this. We support this requirement by including a
patient access control list (PACL). This is where deontic operators, permit (Permit) and forbid
(Forbid) first are used in the model.
The patient access control list is able to express access rules applying to both classes and objects,
depending on both roles and users:
• PATIENTS = a set of patients, {p1, . . . , ps}
• concerns(obj ∈ OBJ)→ PATIENTS, maps each object to the patient which the record
belongs to.
• PACLRULE ⊆ {Permit, Forbid}((U ∪ COR)× (CLASSES ∪OBJ)× ACCRANKS),
a set of patient-specific access control rules.
pacrule = operator(subject, object, accrank) , subject ∈ U∪COR, info ∈ CLASSES∪
OBJ ,accrank ∈ ACCRANKS , operator ∈ {Permit, Forbid}.
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• PACL ⊆ PATIENTS × PACLRULE, a set of patient-specific access control lists
where the patients can give more access or less access, than specified globally, to users
and construction roles.
• aboutpatient(obj ∈ OBJ)→ PATIENTS, a mapping of all information objects into
the patient that they concern.
6.9 Model functions
The whole process of ranking and access control, starting with a user activating roles and ending
with objects being given relevance, detail and permissions, is split into two functions. The first
is called the role construction function, which makes a valid functional role depending on the
user and session, and is found in section 6.9.1. The second function, in section 6.9.2, is the rank
function that assigns relevance, detail, and permissions to objects based on the functional role
constructed in the first function.
6.9.1 Role Construction
Because different roles are given different access privileges, the functional role have to reflect the
access rights for each of the roles it contains. If all the different roles contained in the functional
role are concerned with access on different objects, the access control becomes fixed in a pre-
dictable fashion, because the output is uniquely determined by the input. Because of conflicting
rules this is hardly ever the case; this means that a policy choice have to be made. Conflicting
rules are rules that concern the exact same information class. If two or more conflicting roles are
activated in the same session, a policy choice has to be made as to what kind of rule should result
from the combination. In the specialization project [SØ04], we suggested some of the possible
choices which can be made in this situation, one is handling it as an SoD-violation, the second
is ignoring it, which leads to a non-deterministic role combination, and the third is granting full
access (of every role contained) to the functional role. Similar to this the functional role have
to reflect the ranking for each of the roles it contains. It is important that any denied access
take precedence over ranking, which means ranking of relevance and detail is only done for the
objects the functional role have access.
As defined earlier a functional role consists of several roles and role units, but it is not a union
of these nor does have the same sample space. The functional role is built from all the roles
that the user has legally activated in the session, i.e. it is put together in such a way that it does
not contain any conflicting roles. This is done by enforcing separation of duty constraints. In
addition the ranking rules in the functional role contain only one rule about each direct class.
This way, once the functional role is known, all that is needed for ranking an information object
is knowing to which class it belongs.
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The role construction function is a function that constructs valid functional roles FUR based on
who the user is, and what roles the user has available and activated in a session.
We repeat the definition of the functional role and add two components for describing rules for
the functional role and which class the rule concerns:
• fur(role list : ROLES)→ ROLES × PRIV ×RRMS ×DRMS Formally:
fur(r) = {(role list, prmsa, rrmsa, drmsa)|role list ∈ ROLES ,prmsa ∈ PRIV ,
rrmsa ∈ RRMS ,drmsa ∈ DRMS}
• FURULE ⊆ ACCRANKS × CLASSES, rules for the functional roles, built with he
role-construction function.
• func rule about(furule ∈ FURULE)→ CLASSES, which class this rule concerns.
We have chosen to resolve conflicting rules by having the resulting functional rules contain the
maximum relevance and detail levels of the roles that are activated in the session. The permis-
sions of the functional role are a privilege union of the privileges of the activated roles. This was
suggested in the specialization project [SØ04, p. 58] for handling conflicing rules from different
hierarchies. For conflicting rules from the same hierarchy, that version of the role construction
function picked the rule from the most direct role. In this thesis version of the function, handle
conflicting rules within a role hierarchy in the same way as we handle conflicting rules accross
role hierarchies. This version of the function is thus simpler than the one from the specialization
project.
Figure 6.2 shows the role construction function. Within the role construction function we have
used several other functions. The three most important of these are:
• decide transitivety is made to illustrate the use of the previously defined functions Prior,
Path and Depth.
• can delegate decides that the user may delegate parts of his/her functional role.
• check temporal constraints illustrates that we check temporal constraints. We have not
found it useful to give a more thorough specification of this function.
We also note the functions rule about, parent, isroot and rulesof. They return the class the rule
concerns, the predecessor of an element, the root of an hierarchy and the rules that is contained
in a role respectively. Also role list is used in the function, but is not previously defined. It is
only a list of the roles in the functional role. The design choices made for the role construction
function are further discussed in section 9.2.6.
6.9.2 Function for access control and information ranking
The actual ranking and granting of access is given in the model as a function in pseudo code. The
first part of the function is given in figure 6.3 and the second part is given in 6.4. This function
evaluates the functional role, also handling role and information hierarchies, and then gives the
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function roleconstruction(roles ⊆ ROLES)→ FUR
{
if ∀roles,∀dsd ∈ 2ROLES ,∀role subset ∈ 2ROLES ,
dsd ∈ DSD,role subset ⊆ dsd,
role subset ⊆ roles, | role subset | < n
newfuncrole = (role listnew, furulesnew)
role listnew =
⋃
c∈roles role id(c)
furulesnew = {}
for each rolei ∈ roles
if rolei ∈ UAD then
decide transitivety(rolei)
endif
check temporal constraints(rolei)
a = rolei
while ¬isroot(a) do
for each crulek ∈ rulesof(a)
crulek = ((relk, delk, privk), classb)
for each f ∈ furulesnew
f = ((relf , delf , privf ), classf )
if classf 6= classb then
furulesnew = crulek ∪ furulesnew
else
g = ((max(relf , relg),max(delf , delg), (privf ∪ privg)), classf )
furulesnew = g ∪ furulesnew
endif
next f next crulek
a = parent(a)
endwhile
next rolei
can delegate(newfuncrole)
return newfuncrole
else
DSD violation.
endif
}
Figure 6.2: Role construction function
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correct access and ranking. The function then checks if the patient has forbidden information
from being accessed by this user, or permitted extended access, by checking the access control
list.
In the ranking and granting function we make use of a function called mathrmdirectaccrank.
This function is used to evaluate the Permit and Forbid deontic operators of patient consent.
The function is described in pseudo code in figure 6.5. Like the role construction function the
function for ranking and granting is further discussed in section 9.2.6.
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function rank(obj ∈ OBJ, fur ⊆ FUR, u ∈ U, p ∈ PATIENTS, pacls ⊆ PACL)
→ ACCRANKS
{
accrankresult = (0, 0, {}) (initial value)
ifaboutpatient(obj) = p
classb = instanceof(obj)
do
for each rfurulef ∈ furulesj, (role listj, furulesj) ∈ fur
if classb = func rule about(rfurr)
accrankresult = accrankf , whererfurulef = (accrankf , classb)
match = TRUE
endif
next rfurulef
classb = parent(classb)
while (¬isroot(classb)) ∧ (match = FALSE)
∀rpacl ⊆ pacls, rplacl = (p, rpaclrules)
if ∃paclrm ∈ rpaclrules,paclr = deontoperm(u ∈ U, infom, accrankm)
if obj ∈ infom
if ∃paclrk ∈ rpaclrules where deontoperk = Forbid and infok = obj
if deontoperm = Forbid then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, Forbid, accrankresult)
endif
else
if deontoperm = Permit then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, P ermit, accrankresult)
endif
endif
else if info ∈ {info1 CH . . . CH infon}and info = infon
if ∃paclrk ∈ rpaclrules where deontoperk = Forbid and infok ∈ classes
if deontoperm = Forbid then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, Forbid, accrankresult)
endif
else
if deontoperm = Permit then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, P ermit, accrankresult)
endif
endif
endif
Figure 6.3: Ranking and Granting function I
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else if ∃paclrm ∈ rpaclrules, cmpaclr = (class ∈ ROLES, info, , )
∀caclr ∈ rpaclrules,caclr = deontoperm(role list, info, accrankm),
rolem ∈ ROLES role id(rolem) ∈ role list, fur = (role list, rpaclrules)
if obj ∈ infom
if ∃paclrk ∈ rpaclrules where deontoperk = Forbid and infok = obj
if deontoperm = Forbid then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, Forbid, accrankresult)
endif
else
if deontoperm = Permit then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, P ermit, accrankresult)
endif
endif
else if info ∈ {info1 CH . . . CH infon} and info = infon
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, deontoperm, accrankresult)
if ∃paclrk ∈ rpaclrules where deontoperk = Forbid and infok = infon
ifdeontoperm = Forbid then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, Forbid, accrankresult)
endif
else
if deontoperm = Permit then
accrankresult = directaccrank(accrankm, P ermit, accrankresult)
endif
endif
next caclr
endif
next rpacl
endif
return accrankresult }
Figure 6.4: Ranking and Granting function II
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directaccrank(accranka ∈ ACCRANKS,deonticoperatora ∈ {Permit, Forbid},
accrankb ∈ ACCRANKS)→ ACCRANKS
{
(relb, delb, privb) = accrankb
(rela, dela, priva) = accranka
relc = max(rela, relb)
delc = max(dela, delb)
if directiona = Permit
privc = priva ∪ privb
else if directiona = Forbid
privc = privb \ priva
endif
return accrankc(relc, delc, privc)
}
Figure 6.5: Applying access, relevance and detail rules from a PACL
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6.10 Additive Methods
From the perspective of the user, the ranking assigns each information object a relevance level,
a detail level, and gives the user a set of operations that the user is allowed to perform on the
object. This ranking does not need to be the end of ranking. We may include methods that add
or subtract relevance and detail after the “rank and grant” function is finished with the object.
We proposed some such methods in the specialization project [SØ04, pp. 60-63], and have also
considered new ones. Here’s a non-exhaustive list of possible ranking methods whose results can
be added to the role model ranking:
• Information that is new since the last time the user used the system, could be given an
added relevance. (A trivial example of this is how new messages are given a different
color when viewing an e-mail inbox.)
• Users may have different preferences for what information they need, and may assign a
different relevance or detail level to some information classes. Working habits differ, and
the same class of information thought too highly ranked by one user could be thought too
lowly ranked by another. Permissions should of course not be set in preferences.
The additive preferences could be used by administrators and designers: Whenever a ma-
jority of the users agree, through the preferences, that a class of information is wrongly
ranked, role definitions can be updated. A caveat here is that a majority of the users could
be wrongly downgrading critical information, so experts and guidelines should be con-
sulted before adopting these collective preferences when updating role definitions.
• Guideline-derived rankings could be added. A knowledge base having more specific
knowledge about the relationships between information, could add relevance and detail
to an object. As an example, the role model might assign an relevance 3 and detail 2 to
an object with information about “current drug treatment” based on roles, but a guideline-
based knowledge system may detect a drug interaction with a new prescription, and add
+5 to the relevance. The resulting information object gets a relevance of 3 + 5 = 8 and a
detail of 2 + 0 = 2.
• Past problems could possibly be ranked according to the same rules, and considered to
be instances of the same information classes in a particular implementation of the model.
This could result in all past problems being shown at the same relevance and detail level.
Additive rules could differentiate ranking and access to these past problems by for example
– Considering guidelines, like giving higher ranking to problems sharing the symptoms
or target organs with the problem currently under review; or
– by giving a lower ranking to older problems and problems not under treatment.
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6.11 Summary
In this chapter we presented a model that includes several components. Most important is the
four components of the NIST standard, which includes core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC, static
separation of duty and dynamic separation of duty. The NIST standard is extended with compo-
nents of information ranking. The model is further extended with components that can support
delegation, including three functions to express transitivity, restrictions on how delegation can
take place and a definition of role units. To support the ability to express different context the
model is extended with periodic expressions and run time requests. An access control list is also
added in order to express an individual patients requests. The model is completed with rules and
functions that evaluate the access and ranking a user is given. Thus the final model is presented in
this chapter as a composite of several different models described in the literature, with additional
extensions of information ranking.
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Chapter 7
Implementation
To test and validate the model we make a simple implementation in the Prolog programming
language. This implementation is also used to see whether we can transform the deontic logic
into Prolog without loosing any of the semantics expressed.
This chapter first gives a short introduction of the Prolog programming language and the moti-
vation for using this programming language. The chapter then describes the code structure of
the implementation, before it shows how the implementation is built. The implantation examines
different parts of the model and is presented in stages of progressively higher advancement.
7.1 About the Implementation Language
Prolog [CM03],[SSW94] is a logic programming language. We chose to use Prolog for the im-
plementation, because the clause and list form that are used to make systems in Prolog resembles
the logic expressions of the formal model.
We begun implementing the model in Visual Prolog [Vis05], because we wanted the implemen-
tation to be easily fitted with a prototype graphical user interface (GUI) for role administration.
We later decided to move the implementation into SWI Prolog [SWI03] to accommodate a more
standardized Prolog environment. The implementation does require the presence of some clauses
provided by the SWI Prolog library, particularly list manipulation clauses. The library is free
software under an LGPL-style license. Thus, if the implementation doesn’t appear to work on a
Prolog variant, the problem might be solved by obtaining that library.
If one wants to use the model with a user interface, various GUI tool kits for Prolog can be used
with the implementation. Also, the implementation can easily be moved back into Visual Prolog.
In order to do this, it is required to explicitly type-declare the types of the variables, and also to
provide the SWI Prolog library with declared types.
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7.2 Code Structure
To keep the implementation code manageable, we keep the Prolog statements sectioned accord-
ing to their level of generality. Very general rules, that we expect to apply in most policy domains,
are found in the model file.
The information in the scenario is implemented in a facts file separate from the model file. These
facts include users, roles, role hierarchies, patients, information objects and information class
hierarchies. The facts file also contains the role- and rank-assignments, that is the codified rep-
resentation of the of the local security- and relevance policy.
The facts file is used in the verification of the model, in chapter 8. The general model does place
certain limitations on how the information in the facts file is represented. That is why the rest
of this chapter is not only concerning the model file implementation, but also describes how the
facts are structured in the facts file.
7.3 Implementation of Facts from the Scenario
In the implementation, users are defined as structures with only a name for identification, e.g.
user(’Bob’). The model can contain more information about each user, but we consider that
unnecessary to demonstrate in this implementation. If one wants to extend the user struc-
ture with new fields, like ”user(name,gender,address,phone)”, the only clauses that need to be
changed are the ones where the “name” variables in the “user” structure needs to be bound.
Statements in these clauses would be changed from something like “user(NAME)”, to user
“user(NAME, , , )”.
Likewise, the exact content structures of the information objects are exchangeable. It is not
important to the model exactly how the data fields in each information object are structured. The
only things that matter in this regard are that the information object must be uniquely identifiable,
and that it belongs to the record of a single patient.
Roles are defined with both a name and an integer identifier, e.g. role(15,′HomeNurse′). The
integer identifier is used in the role hierarchy. Thus the parent-child relationship in the hierarchy
is implemented as roleparent(Child, Parent), with Child and Parent as integer identifiers.
For instance roleparent(3, 1). means that role 1 is the parent of role 3.
7.4 Implementation of General Rules in the Model
We chose to do the implementation of the ranking and access model in incremental stages. In
this way, we can validate each part of the model, and each added function, before moving on to
the next stage.
68
7.4 Implementation of General Rules in the Model
In the following code examples, comments are enclosed between /* and */. In these comments,
argument variables are preceded by a ’+’, ’-’ or ’?’, in a style similar to the documentation for
SWI Prolog. These variables indicate how the arguments should be used. ’+’ denotes an input
argument, ’-’ denotes an output argument, while ’?’ denotes an argument that may be either
input to or output from the clause. The code does contain more comments, which can be found
in section D.1.
The rules defined in section 6.8.1, PRULES, RRULES and DRULES are all referred to as
construction rules, to keep them conceptually separate from the functional rules mentioned in
section 6.9.1.
We make a “bare-bones” role construction function before we consider role hierarchies. Then
we proceed with the access and ranking functions with and without information hierarchy, and
with and without considering user identities.
7.4.1 Functional Role Construction, Without Role Hierarchies
The first part of regulating access with the model, is to select rules for classes based on who the
user is, and what roles the user has activated in the session. For simplicity, we first construct a
functional role without considering role hierarchies. Figure 7.1 contains the clause for a func-
tional role without the consideration of hierarchies. Following the figure, some of the called
clauses are explained in detail. The tactic used is to first extract a list of all construction rules
(CRULEs) from the roles that are activated. The activated roles are given a list of construction
roles as the input parameter CONSTLIST . After flattening this list, the construction rules have
to be learned - converted into valid functional rules, FURULEs.
/*
fur nonhier(+CONSTLIST, -FURULEs) :-
*/
fur nonhier(CONSTLIST, FURULEs) :-
dsd ok(CONSTLIST),
crulesinconstlist nonhier(CONSTLIST, COR CRULES),
flatten(COR CRULES,CRULEs),
learnallcrules(CRULEs),
collect furules([],FURULEs).
Figure 7.1: Constructing a functional role without hierarchies
Collecting construction rules is a rather trivial task in the non-hierarchical version of the function.
The clause for this is shown in figure 7.2, in order to compare the clause with the hierarchical
version of the clause in section 7.4.2.
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crulesincor nonhier(CORID,CRULEs) :- findall(CRULE,cor(CORID,CRULE),CRULEs).
Figure 7.2: Collect all construction rules from the roles
The most important rule in 7.2 is the rule for learning the functional rules, learncrule. It is in
this clause, see figure 7.3, that the choices for treating conflicting construction rules are made.
The clause learnallcrules simply invokes learncrule for each of the construction rules in a list.
As mentioned in section 6.9.1, conflicting construction rules are rules about the same class that
happen to activated at the same time. If one of the previously learned rules is about the same
class, the functional rule is retracted and reasserted with new values. If not, the construction
rule is merely learned into the database. After the clause learnallcrules is invoked on a list of
construction rules, the Prolog database contains valid functional rules.
The valid functional rules may now be collected into a list by collect furules in figure 7.1, and
returned as an output parameter. The database is thus cleared and ready for the next role con-
struction.
/*
learncrule(crule(accrank(+REL,+DEL,+PERM),+CLASS)) :-
*/
:- dynamic furule/2.
learncrule(crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PERM),CLASS)) :-
retract(furule(accrank(OLDREL,OLDDEL,OLDPERM),CLASS)),
max(REL,OLDREL,NEWREL),
max(DEL,OLDDEL,NEWDEL),
addperm(PERM,OLDPERM,NEWPERM),
asserta(furule(accrank(NEWREL,NEWDEL,NEWPERM),CLASS)).
learncrule(crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PERM),CLASS)) :-
asserta(furule(accrank(REL,DEL,PERM),CLASS)).
Figure 7.3: Learn a single construction rule into the database
7.4.2 Functional Role Construction, With Role Hierarchy
The hierarchical role construction, shown in figure 7.4, is similar to the non-hierarchical role-
construction, shown in section7.4.1. The only difference is the call to a hierarchical version of
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the crulesinconstlist clause, crulesinconstlist hier. The clause crulesinconstlist hier is shown
together with the clauses dirindir and ancestor in figure 7.5. The rules in COR CRULES are
CRULEs from not only the roles contained in the roles in CONSTLIST , but also all CRULEs
from the ancestors of those roles. Compare these clauses to crulesincor nonhier in figure 7.2.
/*
fur(+CONSTLIST, -FURULEs) :-
*/
fur(CONSTLIST, FURULEs) :-
dsd ok(CONSTLIST),
crulesinconstlist hier(CONSTLIST, COR CRULES),
flatten(COR CRULES,CRULEs),
learnallcrules(CRULEs),
collect furules([],FURULEs).
Figure 7.4: Constructing a functional role with role hierarchies
7.4.3 Ranking Without Information Class Hierarchy
The valid functional role, that is constructed, has only one FURULE and ACCRANK as-
signed to each class. Thus, the final ranking becomes a matter of finding the class the object is
a member of, and then assigning the rankings and permissions associated with that class to the
object. First, we do this only with direct classes, without the class hierarchy.
Figure 7.6 shows the non-hierarchical ranking clause, without the user argument. FUNCROLE
is a valid functional role, and OBJECT is the object to be ranked. ACCRANK is the access-
ranking triplet that is the result and output parameter from the ranking function.
7.4.4 Ranking With Information Class Hierarchy
In this section, the clauses in section 7.4.3 are extended with class hierarchies. Figure 7.7 con-
tains a hierarchical version of the ranking clause. The clause is still without the user argument.
As with the role construction, there is only a slight difference between the hierarchical and non-
hierarchical versions of the function.
The final ranking function is shown in figure 7.8. The final ranking does check for available
roles and static separation of duty. It then constructs a functional role using the role construction
function, and ranking objects with the ranknou clause. We note that this version of the Prolog
implementation does not consider patient access control lists as defined in section 6.8.2.
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crulesincor hier(CORID,CRULEs) :-
findall(CRULE,(dirindir(CORID,D),cor(D,CRULE)),CRULEs).
/* dirindir(?Direct, ?DirIndir)
*/
dirindir(Direct, DirIndir) :-
Direct=DirIndir.
dirindir(Direct, DirIndir) :-
ancestor(Direct,DirIndir).
/* ancestor(?ChildID, ?AncestorID) :-
*/
ancestor(ChildID, AncestorID) :-
objectParent(ChildID, AncestorID).
ancestor(ChildID, AncestorID) :-
objectParent(ChildID, A1),
ancestor(A1, AncestorID).
Figure 7.5: Listing construction rules from roles and ancestors
/* ranknou nonhier(+FURULEs,+OBJECTID,-ACCRANK) :-
*/
ranknou nonhier(FURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK) :-
obj(OBJECTID,CLASS, , ),
member(furule(ACCRANK,CLASS),FURULEs).
Figure 7.6: Ranking an object without class hierarchy
/* ranknou(+FURULEs,?OBJECTID,-ACCRANK) :-
*/
ranknou(fur(CFURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK) :-
obj(OBJECTID,CLASS, , ) ,
rankrecursive(FURULEs,CLASS,ACCRANK).
Figure 7.7: Ranking an object with class hierarchy
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/* rank(+USER,+SESSION,?OBJ,-ACCRANK) :- :-
*/
rank(USER,SESSION,OBJ,ACCRANK) :-
ssd ok(USER) ,
roles available(USER,SESSION) ,
fur(SESSION,FURULEs) ,
OBJ=obj(OBJECTID, , , ) ,
ranknou(FURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK).
Figure 7.8: Ranking an object with class hierarchy
7.4.5 Implementation of Separation of Duty
The implementation contains the ssd ok and dsd ok clauses for checking static and dynamic
separation of duty, respectively. Static separation of duty takes role hierarchies into account,
just as specified in section 6.5. In the implementation SSD is checked at role activation, rather
than at role assignment. This should be changed, so that instead of the regular user, it is the
administrator assigning roles that is alerted of the violation. Dynamic separation of duty does
not take role hierarchies into account, as in the formal model.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce the programming language and the technical environment in which
we implement the model. We then present the implementation, which has clauses for role con-
struction, ranking, separation of duty, and various support clauses. After implementing parts of
the model, the implementation can be tested.
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Chapter 8
Testing and Results
This chapter contains the results from testing the model that is presented in chapter 6. We have
tested this model with the scenario presented in chapter 5. The testing is done with the Prolog
implementation of the model presented in chapter 7. The testing of the model is split into sections
similar to the ones in the implementation chapter, 7. The sections can roughly be divided into
role construction, ranking of and access to information and separation of duties. There is also a
small section showing testing the possibility of using the model with user interfaces.
8.1 Testing the Prolog Implementation
The thesis from the specialization project [SØ04] describes a manually executed application of
the model on two test cases. In this thesis, we use the Prolog implemented version of the model,
presented in chapter 7, for testing.
The first part of the test is done with a implementation of the core model. This means that there
is no role hierarchy, information hierarchy or separation of duty. We then proceed by adding role
hierarchy, information hierarchy and separation of duty. We act as security administrators by
instantiating users, roles, operations, objects and patients, and assigning permissions, relevance
and detail to the roles.
When we test the model we try the different rules to see what objects the user has access to and
what ranking the object has according to the user. Because the EHR system will authenticate
the user, know which roles the user has activated, and which patient and objects that are to be
access and ranked, this testing would show that the permissions and information rankings are
interpreted as intended in the model.
In the implementation, the CONSTLIST and FUR that are constructed are similar to a login
request and role activation. Trying to access an object takes FUR and OBJECT in as input
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parameters and produces ACCRANK as an output parameter. To see the code of the actual
functions being used, see the appendix section D.1.
8.1.1 Functional Role Construction, Without Role Hierarchies
The first property we test is role construction without role hierarchies. The test consists of three
parts. The first is activating two roles that have no rules about the same class, figure 8.1, and
the second is activating two roles that have rules about the same class, figure 8.2. The third part
is for testing that the roles in the second part actually produce different results when activating
them separately, 8.3.
When activating two roles (role 1: Staff and 5: Nurse) that have no rules about the same class,
we get the expected result of a list of rules from both roles, as shown in figure 8.1
?- fur_nonhier([1,5],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 7), furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 9),
furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 4), furule(accrank(4, 1, [2]), 26)]
Figure 8.1: Activating roles 1 and 5 without role hierarchy
When activating two roles (role 10: Internist and 5: Nurse) that have rules about the same class,
we get the expected result, as shown in figure 8.2
?- fur_nonhier([10,5],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(5, 5, [2]), 19), furule(accrank(4, 6, [1, 2, 3]), 26)]
Figure 8.2: Activating roles 5 and 10 without a role hierarchy
If we look at the rules (construction rules) for roles 10: Internist and 5: Nurse in the case file,
we see that they both have rules about class 26. We demonstrate this by separately constructing
functional roles of each construction role in figure 8.3. We get the expected results and this result
also confirms that the result from the second test (figure 8.2) is correct.
?- fur_nonhier([5],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(4, 1, [2]), 26)]
?- fur_nonhier([10],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(5, 5, [2]), 19), furule(accrank(3, 6, [1, 2, 3]), 26)]
Figure 8.3: Activating roles 10 and 5 individually, without role hierarchy
The results from all three parts of the test are as expected. The results show that the rule about
class 26 in the construction of roles 5 and 10 is given the maximum relevance and detail levels
of the rules in each of the construction roles.
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8.1.2 Functional Role Construction, With Role Hierarchy
After testing that the role construction works without hierarchies, the second test make sure that
introducing role hierarchies has the desired effect and that the role construction still works as
expected. The role hierarchies we have used in this case are presented in figure 8.4, which shows
the staff member role hierarchy, and figure 8.5, which shows the location role hierarchy. We note
that the roles in the hierarchies are given numbers, which are corresponding to the numbers used
in the scenario facts file.
1: Staff
3: Secretary
4: Medical Practitioner/
Doctor
7: Intern 
5: Nurse
6: Psychiatrist 8: Cardiologist 
Alice
Bob
10: Internist
Betty
BillyRoger
9: Radiologist
Ben
2: Pharmacist
Figure 8.4: Staff member role hierarchy
From the hierarchy in figure 8.4 we can see that the functional rules resulting from activating
roles 1 and 5 are the same as those activated without role hierarchies. The only difference is that
the list of functional rules is ordered differently, something that is rather irrelevant. The reason
for the functional rules being identical, is that role 1 is the parent role of role 5.
Activating role 7 (Intern), shown in figure 8.6, makes functional rules based on the construction
rules in roles 7 (Intern), 4 (Medical practitioner) and 1 (Staff). If the rules have a conflict, the
maximum of relevance and detail is chosen, and permissions are accumulated. In the scenario,
there are no construction rules for role 7 itself, so the rules are all from roles 4 and 1.
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101: Hospital
105: Internal 
medicine ward
104: Cardiology 
ward103: ICU102: ER
Figure 8.5: Location role hierarchy
fur([7],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(3, 2, [2]), 5), furule(accrank(4, 4, [2]), 6),
furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 7), furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 9),
furule(accrank(4, 2, [2]), 4)] ;
Figure 8.6: Activating role 7 with role hierarchy
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In figure 8.7 the roles 7 (Intern) and 102 (ER) are activated. This makes functional rules based
on roles 102 (ER) and 101 (Hospital), in addition to 7,4 and 1. There are no rules defined for role
101 in the scenario. The results in 8.7 show that role 102 (Location ER) gives the information
class 4 relevance 6, detail 6 and read access. (furule(accrank(6, 6, [2]), 4)). These are higher
relevance and detail levels than those obtained by just having activated role 7 (Position Intern)
furule(accrank(4, 2, [2]), 4).
?- fur([7,102],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(3, 2, [2]), 5), furule(accrank(4, 4, [2]), 6),
furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 7), furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 9),
furule(accrank(6, 6, [2]), 4)] ;
Figure 8.7: Activating roles 7 and 102 with role hierarchy
In figure 8.8 role 10 (Internist) is activated. The result of activating role 10 (Internist) is functional
rules based on the construction rules in roles 10 (Internist),4 (Medical practitioner) and 1 (Staff).
If the rules have a conflict, the maximum of relevance and detail is chosen, and permissions are
accumulated.
?- fur([10],FURULEs).
FURULEs = [furule(accrank(5, 5, [2]), 19), furule(accrank(3, 6, [1, 2, 3]), 26),
furule(accrank(3, 2, [2]), 5), furule(accrank(4, 4, [2]), 6), furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 7),
furule(accrank(1, 1, [2]), 9), furule(accrank(4, 2, [2]), 4)]
Figure 8.8: Activating role 10 with role hierarchy
8.1.3 Ranking Without Information Class Hierarchy
The results in 8.1.2 and 8.1.2 demonstrate that the functional role is correctly constructed both in
presence and absence of role hierarchy. The next part to be tested is the ranking of the information
objects. This test will also consist of two steps; first we are testing ranking without information
class hierarchy, then we are testing with information class hierarchy.
In figure 8.9 we are using the result of activating role 7 (Intern) and 102 (ER) at the same time,
and we ask the question ”What information objects does the Intern in the ER have access to, and
at what relevance and detail levels?”. The answer given in figure 8.9 shows two objects with
corresponding access and ranking.
In figure 8.10 the contents of the information fields are shown. We extract them by re-stating the
question, explicitly asking Prolog to bind variables like CONTENT .
The results show that the Intern in the ER has access to objects numbered 20 (the name ’Elisa
Eliasen’) and 22 (the social security number ’078-05-1120’) with various accranks. These are
only objects that are of direct information classes found in the functional rules. To rank objects
79
8 Testing and Results
?- rank_nonclasshier(’Roger’,[7,102],OBJ,ACCRANK).
OBJ = obj(20, _G1036, _G1037, _G1038)
ACCRANK = accrank(1, 1, [2]) ;
OBJ = obj(22, _G1036, _G1037, _G1038)
ACCRANK = accrank(1, 1, [2]) ;
No
Figure 8.9: Ranking identifiers with roles 7 and 102, without information class hierarchy
?- rank_nonclasshier(’Roger’,[7,102],obj(OBJID,_,_,_),ACCRANK),obj(OBJID,CLASS,PATIENT,CONTENT).
OBJID = 20
ACCRANK = accrank(1, 1, [2])
CLASS = 7
PATIENT = 1
CONTENT = ’Elisa Eliasen’ ;
OBJID = 22
ACCRANK = accrank(1, 1, [2])
CLASS = 9
PATIENT = 1
CONTENT = ’078-05-1120’ ;
No
Figure 8.10: Ranking contents with roles 7 and 102, without information class hierarchy
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that don’t have direct information classes in the functional rules, we need to consider information
class hierarchies.
8.1.4 Ranking With Information Class Hierarchy
The results from ranking information in the absence of an information hierarchy are as expected,
but to avoid the work of making rules for every object for every role we introduce an information
hierarchy in section 7.4.4. The figure 8.11 shows how we place the clinical information classes
used in the testing in a hierarchy. We note that access and ranking to users are given to objects,
which are members of an information class.
In figure 8.12 the use of information class hierarchy is demonstrated. In particular, figure 8.12
shows the objects that the user ’Roger’ acting as an intern in the emergency room (role 7 and
102) has access to, with their corresponding relevance levels, detail levels, permissions and
content. The results show that the Roger the intern in the ER has access to objects numbered
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,11,14,20 and 22 with various relevance levels, detail levels and permissions. In
this case, the permissions are all of type 2 (read).
Important to the results in presence of a information class hierarchy, are that when the user is
denied access to a object that is member of a class that is senior to another class, the user is denied
access to objects of the junior class as well. The ranking in the hierarchy also has the desired
effect with that the object that is member of a class is given at least the ranking of the senior class
if nothing else is stated in the scenario. The results of testing the ranking with hierarchy also
show that using information hierarchy is more effective, because there is less information to be
ranked.
Denying Access
Figure 8.13 and figure 8.14 demonstrate the difference between users trying to activate the same
role. In figure 8.13 we try to let the user ’Roger’ access objects as an internist (role 10) in the
internal medicine ward (role 105). This access fails, because ’Roger’ does not have the internist
role assigned. In figure 8.14 the user ’Billy’ succeed in this role activation, thus he has access to
the objects.
Comparing 8.12 and figure 8.14 we also see that there is a difference between the access given
to Billy (Internist) and Roger (Intern). Billy gets a higher detail level on the current insulin
treatment (object number 11), and also gets permission to do operations 1 (create) and 2 (write)
for that object.
Simulating a User Interface
To test a practical application of information ranking we simulate a user setting a minimum
relevance level in a user interface. Figure 8.15 shows predicate shown by setting the minimum
relevance level to 4 for the user ’Billy’. Only four objects are shown in the interface compared to
twelve in figure 8.14. In figure 8.16 ’Billy’ lowers the relevance level in the user interface to 2.
This shows all the objects shown in figure 8.14, except for the name and social security number.
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Figure 8.11: Clinical information classes in the scenario
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?- rank(’Roger’,[7,102],obj(OBJID,_,_,_),accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV)),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
OBJID = 1,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’diabetes mellitus’ ;
OBJID = 2,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = insulin ;
OBJID = 3,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = hypertension ;
OBJID = 4,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’beta blocker’ ;
OBJID = 5,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = tiazide ;
OBJID = 6,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = hypoglycemia ;
OBJID = 7,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’syncope (fainting)’ ;
OBJID = 8,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’trauma to head’ ;
OBJID = 11,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = insulin ;
OBJID = 14,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’heart attack’ ;
OBJID = 20,REL = 1,DEL = 1,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’Elisa Eliasen’;
OBJID = 22,REL = 1,DEL = 1,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’078-05-1120’ ;
No
Figure 8.12: Ranking contents with roles 7 and 102, with class hierarchy
?- rank(’Roger’,[10,105],obj(OBJID,_,_,_),accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV)),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
Roles not available for activation!
No
Figure 8.13: Trying to activate a role that is not assigned
?- rank(’Billy’,[10,105],obj(OBJID,_,_,_),accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV)),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
OBJID = 1,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’diabetes mellitus’ ;
OBJID = 2,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = insulin ;
OBJID = 3,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = hypertension ;
OBJID = 4,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’beta blocker’ ;
OBJID = 5,REL = 3,DEL = 2,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = tiazide ;
OBJID = 6,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = hypoglycemia ;
OBJID = 7,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’syncope (fainting)’ ;
OBJID = 8,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’trauma to head’ ;
OBJID = 11,REL = 3,DEL = 6,PRIV = [1, 2, 3],CONTENT = insulin ;
OBJID = 14,REL = 4,DEL = 4,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’heart attack’ ;
OBJID = 20,REL = 1,DEL = 1,PRIV = [2],;CONTENT = ’Elisa Eliasen’ ;
OBJID = 22,REL = 1,DEL = 1,PRIV = [2],CONTENT = ’078-05-1120’ ;
No
Figure 8.14: Billy the internist in the internal medicine ward
?- shown(’Billy’,[10,105],4,obj(OBJID,_,_,_),DEL),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
OBJID = 6,DEL = 4,CONTENT = hypoglycemia ;
OBJID = 7,DEL = 4,CONTENT = ’syncope (fainting)’ ;
OBJID = 8,DEL = 4,CONTENT = ’trauma to head’ ;
OBJID = 14,DEL = 4,CONTENT = ’heart attack’ ;
Figure 8.15: Billy wants just an overview
?- shown(’Billy’,[10,105],2,obj(OBJID,_,_,_),DEL),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
Figure 8.16: Billy wants to see more information
83
8 Testing and Results
8.1.5 Separation of Duty
The facts file has the rule ssd([3,4],2), meaning “A user must not have both roles Secretary
and Medical practitioner available for activation”. For the purpose of testing this rule we can
temporarily assign internist Billy to also be a secretary with this rule: userAssignedRole(’Billy’,
[10,3]).. When now trying to access information as Billy, the implementation denies access.
Figure 8.17 shows that even though Billy doesn’t attempt to activate role 3 (secretary), SSD is
violated because he has the role available. Billy is not a direct member of role 4, but is an indirect
member via role 10.
?- shown(’Billy’,[10,102],2,obj(OBJID,_,_,_),DEL),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
Static Separation of Duty violation!
Figure 8.17: An SSD violation
As mentioned in section 7.4.5, checking SSD at role activation is not ideal. It should be done
at user-role assignment, administration operations is not included in the model. Administration
involves changing the facts file and re-consulting it. We change the user-role assignment back to
userAssignedRole(’Billy’, [10]). to remove the SSD violation.
Among the rules in the facts file is the dynamic separation of duty rule
dsd([101,102,103,104,105],2).. This rule implies user can not activate 2 or more of
the location roles at the same time. This encodes the policy that a user can not act as being at
more than one ward at the time. As shown in figure 8.18 ,trying to activate roles 102 and 105 at
the same time triggers an error message and gives no access.
?- shown(’Billy’,[10,102,105],4,obj(OBJID,_,_,_),DEL),obj(OBJID,_,_,CONTENT).
Dynamic Separation of Duty violation!
No
Figure 8.18: A DSD violation, trying to be two places at once
8.2 Key Findings
The findings, when testing the model, are as expected and quite obvious. The key findings from
the test results are as follows:
• Role construction works in both the presence and the absence of role hierarchy.
• The results illustrated the difference in access, relevance and detail between using a role
hierarchy, and not using it.
• Information is ranked by class depending on roles, both in the presence and the absence of
a information hierarchy.
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• The results illustrated the difference in access, relevance and detail between using an in-
formation hierarchy, and not using it.
• Roles are used to express both job function and location, but
• the model is heavily dependent upon the role hierarchy and information hierarchy, and the
correct assignment of permissions, relevance and detail thereto, to be correct.
We note that the following properties are expressed by the model in the current form, but is not
implemented and therefore not tested:
• Delegation.
• Periodic expressions and run-time requests.
• Patient access control list.
Both the results and limitations of the implementation are further discussed in chapter 9 (Discus-
sion).
8.3 Summary
This chapter presents the results of the testing of the model. The testing is done with the Prolog
implementation and is done for role construction, ranking of and access to information and sepa-
ration of duties. The testing resulted in some key findings, which are further discussed in chapter
9.
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Chapter 9
Discussion
This chapter is a discussion of the design choices we made in this thesis. Important to this discus-
sion is the desired effect versus the actual effect. We first consider the choice of the formalism,
in which we present the model, and second we consider the different architectural components
we have used. Subsequent to this the accomplishments and limitations of Prolog implementation
of the model are discussed.
The end of this chapter provides a discussion of possible applications of the model, and it gives
some directions for improvements and future work.
9.1 Using a Formal Language to Express the Role-model
Although not a very large part of this thesis, the choice of a formal language is definitely im-
portant for the thesis. The properties we set for the language are stated in research goal number
three on page 2. These properties are:
• It has to be a formal and expressive language
• It should be based on deontic logic
• It should already be defined in the literature
It is also important, though not stated explicitly in the research goals, that the language should
be computer interpretable for the purpose of making an executable model. The translation and
implementation of the model is further discussed in section 9.3.
As systems become more complicated, and safety becomes a more important issue, the formal
approach to system design offers another level of insurance against design faults. By using a
formal language we have hoped to clearly define the problems, goals and solutions of the model,
and we can by the means of mathematical and logical techniques express, investigate, and analyze
the model and its behavior.
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The reason for choosing deontic logic is that it formalizes the notions of obligations, prohibition
and permissions corresponds to access control activities, , as stated in chapter 2. By using a
language, that is a first order many sorted logic, an implementation of the model can be done
relatively simply in a logic programming language.
It saves us a lot of time to use an already defined language and we could also review how the
language had been applied to other problems.
The language we chose to use is both formal and expressive. It is based on deontic logic and
has already proved to be useful for expressing delegation in a role-based organization. Thus, the
language is especially useful for representing the delegation part of the model. The language
is also well suited to express the rest of the model. We only take full advantage of the deontic
characterization of the language, when it comes to expressing the patient access control list in
the function for ranking and granting in figure 6.3 and 6.4. We also note that we have not used
the agent term in the model and the model slightly deviates from the formalism. This and other
deviations from the language the model might have, is not essential to the fact that the use of a
formalism has made us able to develop a unambiguous model.
9.2 The Different Architectural RBAC Components
The primary aim for this thesis is to create a role-model, which is compliant to access control
activities in the Norwegian EHR standard. In addition to this the model should be used for in-
formation ranking. With several different models for RBAC in the literature and with each of
them solving different aspects of access control, we needed to find those architectural compo-
nents, which together solve the access control activities related to the EHR standard and yet avoid
ambiguity and unnecessary complexity.
9.2.1 Using the NIST Standard
The main reason for choosing the NIST standard as a foundation for the role-model is that it is
considered authoritative work on RBAC. The fact that we used this standard in the specialization
project [SØ04] and therefore are familiar with the standard is also significant for this choice. The
core elements from the NIST standard are of course included in the model, but we had to decide
whether including role hierarchies, static separation of duty and dynamic separation of duties
would be accurate for the Norwegian EHR standard.
9.2.1.1 Adding Role Hierarchies
We found it very useful to include role hierarchies as several different roles in a healthcare or-
ganization are similar, but not equal, in both responsibilities and information needs. It is also
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important that a user may be assigned several roles in a hierarchy, and if users are a part of the
hierarchy it is necessary to include general role hierarchies. When working with the scenario we
also found that it could be useful to define several role hierarchies.
Although the model was only tested and validated on role hierarchies created from the scenario,
the formal definition of role hierarchies in the model supports any implemented hierarchy. To
find complete and correct role hierarchies for a typical hospital in Norway would require separate
effort with empirical work, interviews and analysis (see also future work, section 9.5).
9.2.1.2 Adding Separation of Duties
The reason for including separation of duties in the model is quite obvious. There are several
roles that may not be assigned to single user or activated by a single user in the same session.
Nevertheless it is difficult to conclude when static separation of duties should be used and when
dynamic separation of duties should be used. Although we stated in chapter 3.3.3 that dynamic
separation of duties probably is the most common to occur in a healthcare organization, we
included both static and dynamic separation of duty in the model.
The scenario we used to test the model did not include any obvious cases of separation of duty,
except object-related separation of duty (i.e. creator, owner, approver etc. of a single information
object). Since the model considers separation of duty between roles independently of the objects,
we had to leave that kind of SoD to possible further work, and rather introduce some other rules
for SSD and DSD. With these rules, the results in section 8.1.5 show that separation of duties
have the intended effect.
9.2.2 Extending the NIST Standard
To comply with the Norwegian EHR standard the model has to be extended in order to handle
delegation, context and patients preferences. We looked at two different approaches to make
these extensions. One is to extend the model with traditional delegation, temporal RBAC and an
access control list for patient preferences. The other is the OASIS architecture, which uses role
parametrization to achieve a more fine grained access control. The OASIS approach supports
delegation and it could also be used for a context representation. Because traditional delegation
and temporal RBAC are more compatible with the NIST standard, we chose to follow the first
approach rather than the OASIS-approach.
9.2.2.1 Delegated Roles and Role Units
One of the requirements in the Norwegian EHR standard is that a user should be able to act on
behalf of another user. Thus, this user would require some of the same access privileges as the
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user it is acting on behalf of. The model we have developed reflect this requirement by introduc-
ing delegation. One important reason for separating the delegated roles and the assigned roles,
is that it makes revocation of delegation possible. A second reason is that it makes it possible
to configure, based on local policy, different properties of delegation, such as transitively, com-
pleteness and permanence.
Another design issue related to delegation is the introduction of role units, which are collections
of access privileges smaller than roles. This makes it possible to choose which permissions one
wants do delegate. This is also in accordance to the delegation requirement in the EHR standard.
The formal approach to delegation gives a precise way of interpreting delegation in the model.
The only problem we encounter when formalizing delegation, is the fact that delegation in a
healthcare organization can be informal or implicit. If implicit delegations are to be used in the
access control model, they must be formalized and handled in some deterministic way, even if
they might not need to be turned into explicit delegation.
9.2.2.2 Representing the Context
Access control activities with the Norwegian EHR standard as a basis, are heavily dependent on
the context, in which access is given. This is reflected in the model by having roles related to
both location and to care phase1, in addition to existing roles that relate to job position and job
functions. The run time request and periodicity expressions are made to support these roles with
temporal constraints and a changing environment.
Although the model expresses roles as points in the care process, periodicity and run time request,
the model’s time representation is quite simple. This is to keep the model compatible with the
NIST standard and to avoid unnecessary complexity. The actual implementation of the time
concept is omitted due to the need for a lot of support data and several databases. The limitations
of the implementation are more thoroughly discussed in section 9.3.
9.2.3 Access Relating to the Patient
To gain access to healthcare information there are two key requirements that need to be fulfilled.
The first is; that access is given as a consequence of a decision to bring about some action,
usually providing care to the patient. The second is; that the patient has to approve that his or her
healthcare information can be accessed. Both of these requirements introduce some difficulties
that have to be solved.
The first requirement makes access control context and patient dependent. When the patient
is already admitted to the hospital we assume that he or she requires healthcare, so access to
healthcare information is granted to someone. We have assumed in the testing of the model, that
the users trying to access a patient’s record actually are performing some kind of care. Thus, if
1Phase in the care process that the patient is in.
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a user is on duty on the same ward as the patient is admitted, the user has a right to that patient
information in accordance to his/her job position, i.e. nurse or doctor. This is a reasonable
assumption, because healthcare personnel often have to obtain information immediately; a more
restrictive access control could complicate the care process.
The second requirement is not a problem as long as all patients approve that anyone who fulfills
the first requirement, gain access to their patient records. Because the patients are entitled to
deny anyone access to their information, the model must support this. To use a purely role-
based approach would be possible, i.e. coding patients’ preferences in each and every role, but
this would introduce security administration overhead; which is precisely the problem RBAC
is trying to avoid. Thus, we introduced an access control list, which revokes access from users
and roles, which originally have access based on their role, but that are not allowed to access
information because of patient preferences.
Another solution to these two difficulties is to use role parametrization, this would perhaps be
a way of making object-related roles and patient-related roles. This is probably a more elegant
solution, but we have not studied this option any further.
We manually validated the use of a patient access control list in the specialization project [SØ04]
In this version we have not tested this use. Neither did we include it in the Prolog implementation,
discussed in section 9.3.
9.2.4 Role Dependencies
Having different roles to express both job functions and the context, make the activation of one
role dependent on the activation of another role. For instance being doctor on call requires the
user both to activate the role as a doctor and on call. We suggest three ways of solving role
dependency:
The first is that we can treat each role like doctor on call or nurse on call as individual roles.
This solution yields one giant role hierarchy, where the number of roles isM ∗N , whereM and
N are the numbers of roles in two distinct hierarchies. With additional hierarchies this solution
is inefficient.
The second option, and included in the model, is letting each role have access privileges and
information ranking regardless of the other roles, and only increasing access privileges if nec-
essary. This is also in accordance to the EHR standard, which states that a user may activate
several roles. A down side to this solution is that the solution can not force a user to activate sev-
eral roles at once to gain privileges. For instance, a user in the scenario should need to activate
at least one role in the staff member hierarchy, one role in the location hierarchy and one role in
the responsibility hierarchy to make this solution work adequately 2. This solution lets the user
2In our model, SoD rules are expressed as (rs, n), where maximum n−1 roles in rsmay be used at once (section
6.5). If SoD is expressed with (rs, n,m), where maximum n−1 and minimumm+1 roles in rsmay be used, SoD
rules could be used to require that one role from each role hierarchy is activated.
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gain some privileges by just activating one of those roles.
A third solution to this is using parametrization of roles, which make it easier to introduce de-
pendencies among roles. This is similar to the second solution, but have the advantage that it can
make role dependencies independent of hierarchies, see section 9.5 for future work.
9.2.5 Information Ranking and Access Control Model
Another one of the research goals for this thesis is to use the role-model we developed for both
access control and information ranking. The reason for this approach is that access control and
information ranking are closely related. The main goal of access control is to prevent users from
obtaining information they are not authorized for. Access control can also be used to prevent
users from obtaining a lot of unnecessary information. This is where information ranking can be
used, by giving ”more” access to some objects that are believed to be important and hiding other
unimportant information. Thus the user can access the information, but is not bothered with it in
an already information intensive work environment.
To allow for effective information ranking we have done some important design choices. The
first choice is to use information classes and information hierarchies. The second choice is to
rank information with two parameters. The third and final design choice is how we wanted to
relate information ranking to the model.
We note that some of the design choices were already made and discussed in the specialization
project [SØ04], but we discuss them here because they are important to the understanding of the
design.
9.2.5.1 Information Classes and Hierarchies
It is necessary to include information classes and hierarchies in order to model patient data for
efficient access control and information ranking. The concept of placing information objects in
information classes is partly obtained from the Norwegian EHR standard and partly from other
approaches to patient data modelling. The concept of information hierarchies is adopted from
the role hierarchies in the NIST standard. The reason for modelling patient data like this, is that
it is easier to administrate both access permissions and information ranking for particular roles.
All test data supports that using information classes and hierarchies is a correct choice.
9.2.5.2 Using Two Parameters
The choice to rank information with both relevance and detail is a design choice we discussed
thoroughly with our supervisor when working with the specialization project [SØ04, pp. 50–53].
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The two parameters were chosen, because they are both complementary and relatively indepen-
dent. Relevance supports prioritizing of information and detail ranking shows information with
different precisions.
The relevance and detail ranking should be done for each role similarly to how access permissions
are given, making use of both role hierarchy and information hierarchy.
The outcome we hoped for from the test results was that the amount of information would be
reduced because of a lower relevance level, the information with the highest relevance would be
displayed regardless of the detail ranking, and that this ranking was according with the scenario.
The results are positive to both reducing the amount of information shown and assigning detail
levels, though we realize that the result may be biased because the scenario is made by us, for
the purpose of demonstrating the model.
9.2.5.3 Relating Information Ranking to the Model
Because information ranking is closely related to access control we discussed several options for
combining relevance ranking, detail ranking and permissions in the specialization project [SØ04,
pp. 50–53]. The two main options discussed were combining detail ranking with permissions
and having relevance ranking independent of these; or having permission, detail and relevance
all independent of each other. The latter design was chosen because it is a much simpler and a
more flexible design.
9.2.6 Functions
The role construction function, in section 6.8, is made to reflect the access rights, for each of
the roles it contains, with role hierarchies. The results from the tests shows that this is achieved.
Because we are unable to test delegation and temporal constraints with the implementation, we
decided not to advance delegation and temporal constraints in the function. Thus, the function
has a trivial solution for treating this.
The ranking and granting function, in section 6.8, evaluates the functional role, make use of
information hierarchies, and then gives the correct access and ranking to objects. The first goal
of this function is to illustrate the purposes and effect of information hierarchies. The second
is to illustrate how an access control list can be used in the model. These goals are met in the
model, but not in the implementation. Only the evaluation of hierarchies and the subsequent
access permissions and information ranking are implemented, (see section 9.3). The evaluation
of the patient access control list was tested and found reasonable in the specialization project
[SØ04]. The patient access control is used to reflect the patient preferences, and is therefore an
absolute necessity in order to comply with the Norwegian EHR standard.
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9.3 The Prolog Implementation of the Model
As stated in section 9.1, the implementation is done in order to test different qualities of the
model. This implied that the formal model could be made executable in a programming language.
Because the formalism is based on deontic logic, we assumed that a logic programming language
would be adequate for this task. Thus, the implementation would be a translation from one logic
language into another.
The implementation is only useful for testing certain qualities of the model. Because the imple-
mentation is only meant to show that the formal model could be made executable and provide
test results for validating it, the discussion of the practical use of the implementation must be
seen from that perspective. Thus, the implementation should be useful to show that the formal
model could be made executable, and that this is useful for testing and validating the model.
9.3.1 Translation From One Language To Another
Implementing the model in Prolog meant that we had to transform the model’s formulae into
conjunctions of Horn clauses. We have done this translation, but only with partial success. This
is because only parts of the model are actually implemented. In addition the representation of the
model deviated slightly from the original language. Although the partial implementation worked
appropriately and the model is expressed formally, we cannot conclude whether all parts of the
model, or if deontic logic can be implemented.
9.3.2 Limitations of the Implementation
As mentioned in section 8.2, delegation, periodic expressions and patient access control lists are
not part of the implementation.
In order to complete the implementation some compromises had to be made between the ne-
cessities of engineering and the goals for formal design. The implementation does not support
delegation nor does it support periodic expression and run time expressions. Implementing del-
egation could have demonstrated how the delegated role would be handled as an assigned role,
with some added attributes that would support revocation and restriction of how delegation would
take place. Implementing periodic expressions and run-time request would not have changed
much of the model, because this can be tested by only changing the facts for placing time con-
straints and environment changes and then run the implementation once more. In effect, the
implementation supports the most essential parts of the model and is effective for testing and
validating the model.
The implementation also lacks the ability to express patient access control lists. This is a signif-
icant limitation, but this is still not essential to the value of the implementation. We showed that
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parts of the model can be implemented, and the implementation can be extended with the parts
missing. (See section 9.5).
SSD is implemented for hierarchies, while DSD is implemented in a non-hierarchical manner.
This corresponds to the NIST standard definitions, and is not necessarily something that should
be changed, but one should be aware of this when defining and encoding SoD policy.
9.4 Application of the Model
When we look at the application of the model we have developed, there are two closely related
areas that have to be discussed. The first is whether to use the model in a centralized or a
distributed method for RBAC. The second area is whether to use the model on top of many
systems or integrating the model within single systems.
9.4.1 Centralized versus Distributed RBAC
Many existing methods of using RBAC are centralized, but as many services are distributed
across numerous servers, it becomes more attractive to use a distributed RBAC method.
The main argument for choosing a distributed approach, is that access control models must keep
up with how the architectures of most computing systems are shifting from being centralized to
being distributed. This require a de-centralized fine-grained access control model, instead of a
centralized coarse grained access control model. Also when a system becomes larger, the RBAC
control system becomes larger. Because every operation of the user is controlled by the RBAC
system, a centralized approach can become the bottleneck of the system.
The main argument for choosing a centralized approach, is that administration of roles in a dis-
tributed environment is more intricate. All the systems may not support role hierarchies and every
role may not be present on every server. Permission-role assignment is typically done indepen-
dently at each local system. One example is how a PACS (picture archive and communication
system) server and an EHR server can independently determine what privileges are available to
the same doctor role. In general, user-role assignment is a logically centralized service, since
the same enterprise role may occur on multiple servers. Here, the treatment of the role hierarchy
centralized imposes the same seniority relationship at each server.
This version of the model is heavily dependent upon reasonable role engineering (see section
9.5.3). In a healthcare organization it would probably be preferred to do this centrally, because
access to information may literally be a matter of life and death. It is therefore not likely that
”distributed” security administrators may decide who may or may not access information.
Even though the system might use a centralized method, availability and resilience would benefit
from having local caches for access control, and having redundancy in the centralized servers.
95
9 Discussion
This would help make available potentially life-saving information during power and communi-
cations failures. Just providing full access under those situations is not ideal, since all a malicious
user would have to do to gain access would be to cut the communication.
9.4.2 On Top of Systems or Integrated in a System
The model we have developed is a general access control model, which can be used for relevance
and detail ranking as well. There are two different ways of applying the model. The first is using
the model for access control on top of existing systems in a healthcare organization and provide
access control and information ranking for all the different systems. The second is integrating
the access control model within each system and provide access control for the specific system.
We belive the model can be used for both purposes. The first has the advantage that the access
control policy for the entire organization is placed in one application. The drawback is that it is
too simple with large granulated role hierarchies or too complex with fine granulated role hier-
archies. The second application has the advantage that it can implement access control policies
for single applications, thus keeping the fine grained role hierarchies, and avoid unnecessary
complexity; but the access control policy has to be implemented several places, complicating
consistency and updates.
9.4.3 Adding Relevance and Detail
A related question to the application of the model, is whether the role model should be the only
source of relevance values for objects. See section 6.10 for some potential sources of additional
relevance and detail level values. These, possibly negative, values could be added to the relevance
and detail that is output from the role model.
We observe that with a class hierarchy, the model can not encode or detect drug interactions,
abnormalities, or highlight a possible diagnosis based in the information in the record. This is
the domain of guideline based decision support. On the one hand, the ranking from the role model
is simpler in concept and encoding. On the other hand, using guidelines is one of the significant
potential advantages of using electronic health records. Thus, it is essential to prepare the model
for additive functions. We also see the possibility of traditional decision support systems using
the role model.
9.5 Future work
More work is required in order to make this model sufficient and for covering the security policy
for a healthcare organization. This work belongs in three categories. The first is improvement
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on the model itself, the second is improvement on the implementation, and the third is the work
that relates to building role hierarchies and information hierarchies.
9.5.1 Model Improvements
The model, which is developed, does support the requirements from the Norwegian EHR stan-
dard, but by using parametrization the design could have been slightly more elegant. Unfor-
tunately, we believe that the OASIS model, which uses parametrization, is unsuitable to use
together with the NIST standard. Parametrization could provide a simpler and more elegant
solution to special issues, like role dependencies, object-related roles and patient-related roles.
Thus including parametrization in such a way that it is suitable with the rest of the model, could
prove to be beneficiary.
9.5.2 Implementing the Model Within a Healthcare Information System
We have implemented a simple prototype of the model in Prolog. The next step for an imple-
mentation would be to implement the entire model. This means, as mentioned in section 9.3, to
include delegation, periodic expressions and patient access control lists in the implementation.
It would also require implementing the support functions for periodic expressions and run-time
requests.
The next step is to implement the model in relation to a healthcare information system. This
would control access to the system in addition to have relevance and detail ranking tested with a
user interface.
9.5.3 Role Engineering
Before all the benefits of RBAC can be realized, all the role-permission assignment have to be
correctly defined. This process, called role engineering, aims to define a set of roles that is
complete, correct, and efficient. The role engineering process must capture the organization’s
business rules, as these relate to access control, and reflect these rules in defining, naming, struc-
turing, and constraining a valid set of roles. In short, this means that for the model to be efficient,
the components to be defined as part of a role engineering process are:
• Roles
• Permissions
• Relevance
• Detail
• Constraints
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• Hierarchies
In addition to this, the patient data has to be modeled so that it is complete, correct, and efficient,
and in a form that is compatible with the model.
We have not included role engineering as part of this thesis, because it is a research area of
its own. It is a very important part of applying the model. If the role engineering process is
done inappropriately, a role-based access control scheme and indeed the model, which we have
developed, would also seem inappropriate.
9.6 Summary
This chapter is a discussion of the design choices we have made in this thesis. The language we
chose to use is both formal and expressive. It is based on deontic logic and has already proved to
be useful for expressing delegation in a role-based organization. Thus, the language is especially
useful for representing the delegation part of the model. The language is also well suited to
express the rest of the model. We have augmented for the different architectural components
used in the model, including the NIST standard components, delegation component, temporal
components and the access control list used to support patient preferences. We have also made
some suggestions for application of the model. In the future work we have presented, we suggest
role parametrization as a possible alternative solution for making roles that are related to patients.
The discussion is used for stating the conclusions of this thesis.
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Conclusion
This thesis presents a formal model for access control and information ranking. The model is
developed with the healthcare domain in mind. Thus, the model is equipped with the necessary
definitions to encode a policy that fulfills the requirements for delegation, time dependency,
and role dependency in the access control part of the Norwegian standard for electronic health
records.
An important discovery is that traditional role based access control models are insufficient on
their own in order to support patient preferences. The model in this thesis supports patient
preferences by adding an access control list, but the thesis also indicates that role parametrization
could be used to make a more elegant solution to this problem.
The concepts of information ranking were clarified through formal expressions and through given
examples. Information ranking can be used in relation with access control to prevent users from
obtaining a lot of unnecessary information. Thus, the user is not bothered with unimportant
information in an information intensive work environment. Two very important properties of
information ranking, are that it does not require any input from the user and it does not prevent
the user from obtaining any information the user requires.
The formal model is partially implemented in Prolog. The implementation has two major objec-
tives. The first is to test and validate the model using data from a scenario. The results of the
tests show that the implementation behaves consistently with the formal definition and with our
expectations. The implementation lacks the ability to express delegation, time dependency and
patient preferences. The implementation is thus insufficient for testing wether or not the model
complies with the Norwegian EHR standard, but it did successfully validate the parts that are
implemented.
The second objective for implementing the model is to see whether deontic logic can be im-
plemented using a logic programming language. The implementation as it is, is not an imple-
mentation of deontic logic. For the deontic operations to be useful with our model, we first had
to implement the parts of the model on which the final ranking function was dependent. With
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those in place, the implementation can be further extended with deontic operations and patient
preferences.
Combining information ranking with access control is not only feasible, but also efficient. With
multiple hierarchies of roles and information classes, policies for access and information ranking
may be flexibly encoded. A few rules placed in general roles apply to all their descendants,
and the descendant roles only need rules about how they differ from their ancestors. With the
exception of patient preferences, all rules about how information is shown are collected in one
place, namely in the role.
When fully implemented, a hybrid role model would be an effective means for granting access
to and ranking of healthcare information, preferably assisted by a traditional decision support
system.
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Glossary
ACL Access Control List: Here a patient access preferences
Cardiology: A branch of medicine studying the heart.
CAVE: a caveat, a warning, from cavere (Latin).
CPR: Computerized Patient Record
Construction role: A role that preforms as a building block for a functional role
DAC: Discretionary Access Control
DSD: Dynamic Separation of Duty
Electronic patient record/Electronic health record (EPR/EHR): A set of information about
patients and their treatment
Epicrisis: Discharge letter
ER: Emergency Room
Functional role: The active role a user requires in a session.
GP: General Practitioner
HCO: Healthcare organization
Health care authority: An enterprise in the healthcare sector.
ICU: Intensive Care Unit
Intern: A recently graduated physician practicing medicine under supervision.
Internist: A physician specializing in internal medicine
ICD-10: International Classification of Diseases A systematic classification of all diseases. Used
primarily in hospitals.
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LGPL: { Lesser | Library } GNU Public License.
See http://www.fsf.org/licensing or http://creativecommons.org
for more information.
MAC: Mandatory Access Control
Pediatrician: A physician who specializes in treating infants and children up to adolescence.
RBAC: Role-Based Access Control
SoD: Separation of Duty
SSD: Static Separation of Duty
Subject: Something or somebody attempting to access information.
Urology: The study and treatment of diseases that affect the urinary system.
User: A human user of a computer system. A human Subject.
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Detailed Information From the Scenario
This appendix contains some of the detailed information from the scenario, described in section
5.1. Patient data is in section sec:appcasedata. (The class and role hierarchies are found in
chapter 8.1.3.) The Prolog-encoded facts are found in section C.2.
C.1 Patient Data
Existing problem: Diabetes mellitus.
Existing problem: Hypertension.
Existing med: Insulin.
Existing med: Beta blocker.
Existing med: Tiazide.
Current problem: Hypoglycemia.
Current problem: Syncope (fainting).
Current problem: Trauma to head.
Location 1: The emergency room (ER).
Intern prescribes a medicine to stabilize the blood sugar.
Intern requests a CT, because the patient has suffered from a head trauma when passing out,
because of the hypoglycemia.
After having stabilized Elisa she is sent to radiology for CT and then returned to the medical
ward.
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Location 2: Internal medicine ward.
Internist prescribe a new dosage of insulin.
Nurse who deliver insulin dosage.
Nurse who also keeps track of the blood sugar and blood pressure of Elisa.
Current problem: Heart attack
Location 3: Cardiology unit
Cardiology team takes over the care of the patient.
Location 4: Internal medicine ward.
Discharged
Told to see his/her primary care doctor for follow-up care.
An involved doctor dictated discharge papers.
Secretary writes discharge papers.
Same involved doctor signed discharge papers.
Senior resident counter signed discharge papers.
C.2 Case Code (Facts)
/* Regular facts CASE (defined in accordance with our model, and the
case described in the thesis. Used to test the model*/
/*Users*/
user(’Roger’).
user(’Billy’).
user(’Betty’).
user(’Ben’). /* The radiologist */
user(’Alice’).
user(’Bob’).
/*userAssignedRoles*/
userAssignedRole(’Elisa’, []).
userAssignedRole(’Roger’, [7]).
userAssignedRole(’Billy’, [10]).
/* userAssignedRole(’Billy’, [10,3]).*/ /* Violate SSD */
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userAssignedRole(’Betty’, [5]).
userAssignedRole(’Ben’, [9]).
userAssignedRole(’Alice’, [8]).
userAssignedRole(’Bob’, [3]).
userAssignedRole(_, [101,102,103,104,105]).
/* Information objects */
/* obj(objectid, classid, patientid, information) */
obj(1, 24, 1,’diabetes mellitus’).
obj(2, 24, 1,’insulin’).
obj(3, 24, 1, ’hypertension’).
obj(4, 21, 1, ’beta blocker’).
obj(5, 21, 1, ’tiazide’).
obj(6, 28, 1, ’hypoglycemia’).
obj(7, 29, 1, ’syncope (fainting)’).
obj(8, 28, 1, ’trauma to head’).
obj(9, 17, 1, image(’ct’,’MMUgzvzxAHc’)).
obj(10, 18, 1, ’glucose solution’).
obj(11, 26, 1, ’insulin’).
/* obj(12, 10, 1, test(’blood glucose’,)). Skal skrives..*/
/* obj(13, 10, 1, test(’blood pressure’,,)). */
obj(14, 28, 1, ’heart attack’).
/* obj(, , , ’’). */
obj(20, 7, 1, ’Elisa Eliasen’).
obj(21, 8, 1, ’Metroville’).
obj(22, 9, 1, ’078-05-1120’).
/*Roles*/
/* Staff */
role(1,’Staff’).
role(2,’Pharmacist’).
role(3,’Secretary’).
role(4,’Medical practitioner’).
role(5,’Nurse’).
role(6,’Psychiatrist’).
role(7,’Intern’). /* Perhaps belongs in a different hierarchy, like Resident,
On trial, etc. with regards to countersigning */
role(8,’Cardiologist’).
role(9,’Radiologist’).
role(10,’Internist’).
/* Location */
role(101,’Hospital’).
role(102,’ER’).
role(103,’ICU’).
role(104,’Cardiology ward’).
role(105,’Internal medicine’).
/*roleparent (Child, Parent)*/
roleparent(2,1).
roleparent(3,1).
roleparent(4,1).
roleparent(5,1).
109
C Detailed Information From the Scenario
roleparent(6,4).
roleparent(7,4).
roleparent(8,4).
roleparent(9,4).
roleparent(10,4).
roleparent(102,101).
roleparent(103,101).
roleparent(104,101).
roleparent(105,101).
/*SSD*/
/*ssd(RoleSet,N)*/
:- dynamic ssd/2.
ssd([3,4],2).
/*DSD*/
/* dsd(RoleSet,N)*/
:- dynamic dsd/2.
dsd([101,102,103,104,105],2).
/*Information classes*/
/* infoclass(classid,classname) */
infoclass(1, ’Clinical Information’).
infoclass(2, ’Personalia’).
infoclass(3, ’TestResults’).
infoclass(4, ’CAVE’).
infoclass(5, ’Medical history’).
infoclass(6, ’Current’).
infoclass(7, ’Name’).
infoclass(8, ’Adress’).
infoclass(9, ’SocialSecurityNumber’).
infoclass(10, ’Clinical’).
infoclass(11, ’Imaging’).
infoclass(12, ’Laboratory’).
infoclass(13, ’Historic Treatment’).
infoclass(14, ’Historic Problem’).
infoclass(15, ’Current Treatment’).
infoclass(16, ’Current Problem’).
infoclass(17, ’CT’).
infoclass(18, ’X-ray’).
infoclass(19, ’Blood sample’).
infoclass(20, ’Urine sample’).
infoclass(21, ’Historic Drug treatment’).
infoclass(22, ’Historic Therapy’).
infoclass(23, ’Historic Problem date’).
infoclass(24, ’Diagnosis’).
infoclass(25, ’Symptom’).
infoclass(26, ’Drug treatment’).
infoclass(27, ’Therapy’).
infoclass(28, ’CurrentDiagnosis’).
infoclass(29, ’CurrentSymptoms’).
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/*Information hierarchy objectParent(Child, Parent)*/
objectParent(2,1).
objectParent(3,1).
objectParent(4,1).
objectParent(5,1).
objectParent(6,1).
objectParent(7,2).
objectParent(8,2).
objectParent(9,2).
objectParent(10,3).
objectParent(11,3).
objectParent(12,3).
objectParent(13,5).
objectParent(14,5).
objectParent(15,6).
objectParent(16,6).
objectParent(17,11).
objectParent(18,11).
objectParent(19,12).
objectParent(20,12).
objectParent(21,13).
objectParent(22,13).
objectParent(23,14).
objectParent(24,14).
objectParent(25,14).
objectParent(26,15).
objectParent(27,15).
objectParent(28,16).
objectParent(29,16).
/*operations*/
operation(1, ’create’).
operation(2, ’read’).
operation(3, ’write’).
operation(4, ’approve’).
operation(5, ’invalidate’).
operation(6, ’correct’).
/* Rules for roles
Rules about aclass can both be deined in a single rule
cor(CORID,crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV),CLASS))
or individual rules about ranking or class*/
/* A combined construction role that puts single assignments together.
Remember that permissions really are lists.*/
/*cor(CORID,crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV),CLASS)).*/
cor(CORID,crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV),CLASS)) :-
roleAssignedPermission(CORID,CLASS,PRIV),
roleAssignedRelevance(CORID,CLASS,REL),
roleAssignedDetail(CORID,CLASS,DEL).
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/* Staff */
roleAssignedPermission(1,7,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(1,7,1).
roleAssignedDetail(1,7,1).
roleAssignedPermission(1,9,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(1,9,1).
roleAssignedDetail(1,9,1).
roleAssignedPermission(1,4,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(1,4,1).
roleAssignedDetail(1,4,1).
/* Medical practitioner */
roleAssignedPermission(4,5,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(4,5,3).
roleAssignedDetail(4,5,2).
roleAssignedPermission(4,6,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(4,6,4).
roleAssignedDetail(4,6,4).
roleAssignedPermission(4,4,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(4,4,4).
roleAssignedDetail(4,4,2).
/* Internist */
cor(10,crule(accrank(5,5,[2]),19)).
cor(10,crule(accrank(3,6,[1,2,3]),26)).
/* Nurse */
roleAssignedPermission(5,26,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(5,26,4).
roleAssignedDetail(5,26,1).
/* Radiologist */
roleAssignedPermission(9,11,[1,2,3,4]).
roleAssignedRelevance(9,11,5).
roleAssignedDetail(9,11,6).
/* Secretary */
roleAssignedPermission(3,2,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(3,2,4).
roleAssignedDetail(3,2,5).
/* Location role rules */
/* ER */
roleAssignedPermission(102,4,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(102,4,6).
roleAssignedDetail(102,4,6).
/* ICU */
roleAssignedPermission(103,4,[2]).
roleAssignedRelevance(103,4,5).
roleAssignedDetail(103,4,5).
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Prolog Code
This appendix contains a listing of the code in the model implementation, described in chapter
7. The code may also be downloaded from the thesis homepage at
http://gunnarre.nvg.org/studies/rmhc.
D.1 Model Code
/* A role model for ranking and access control.
Copyright c©2004-2005 Bjørn-Erik Stenbakk and Gunnar Rene´ Øie
All rights reserved.
http://gunnarre.nvg.org/studies/rmhc/
Made for SWI prolog. Some of the predicates in the SWI prolog library is used.
See http://www.swi-prolog.org for licensing
In the comments in the following code examples, argument variables preceeded by a
’+’, ’-’ or ’?’, in a style similar to the documentation for SWI Prolog. These
indicate how the arguments should be used. ’+’ denotes an input argument, ’-’
denotes an output argument, while ’?’ denotes an argument that may be either input
to or output from the predicate.
*/
/**********
* Setup *
**********/
/*
Setup rules that may be manually run.
set_prolog_flag(toplevel_print_options,[quoted(true), portray(true),
attributes(portray), max_depth(20)]).
*/
/*******************************************
* Genereic rules used in the other rules *
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*******************************************/
/* List and graph search rules etc.*/
/* max(+X,+Y,-MAX) */
max(X,Y,X) :- X >= Y.
max(_,Y,Y).
/*******************************************
* Model rules apply to all organizations and policies*
*******************************************/
/* The main focus of our assignment.*/
/* Creating a "functional" role
Post-condition:
A set of rules for this composite role.
No rules about the exact same class.
But overlapping hierarchies of object classes allowed.
Build a list of all rules that apply to this role.
If two rules concern the exact same class or object, then use
max of REL and DEL, and add privileges.
Then, rewrite the thing for deontic operation.
*/
/*
fur_nonhier(+CONSTLIST, -FURULEs) :-
The functional role fur is made up of CONSTLIST, which is a list of the
construction roles that took part in building the fur, and FURULEs, which is a
flat list of rules.
This version does not take role hierarchies into account.
*/
fur_nonhier(CONSTLIST, FURULEs) :-
dsd_ok(CONSTLIST),/* Check DSD */
crulesinconstlist_nonhier(CONSTLIST, COR_CRULES),
/* Make a list of lists of CRULEs */
flatten(COR_CRULES,CRULEs), /* Flatten the list of CRULES */
learnallcrules(CRULEs), /* Learn/resolve rules from the roles */
collect_furules([],FURULEs). /* Collect the furules into a list.*/
/*
fur(+CONSTLIST, -FURULEs) :-
The functional role fur is made up of CONSTLIST, which is a list of the
construction roles that took part in building the fur, and FURULEs, which
is a flat list of rules.
This version uses role hierarchies.
*/
fur(CONSTLIST, FURULEs) :-
dsd_ok(CONSTLIST),/* Check DSD */
crulesinconstlist_hier(CONSTLIST, COR_CRULES),
/* Make a list of lists of CRULEs*/
flatten(COR_CRULES,CRULEs), /* Flatten the list of CRULES */
learnallcrules(CRULEs), /* Learn/resolve rules from the roles */
collect_furules([],FURULEs). /* Collect the furules into a list.*/
crulesincor_nonhier(CORID,CRULEs) :- findall(CRULE,cor(CORID,CRULE),CRULEs).
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crulesincor_hier(CORID,CRULEs) :-
findall(CRULE,(dirindir(CORID,D),cor(D,CRULE)),CRULEs).
/*
learnallcrules(+CRULEs) :-
Given a list of CRULEs, send them all to the predicate "learncrule".
*/
learnallcrules([]).
learnallcrules([CRULE|CRULEsTail]) :-
learncrule(CRULE),
!,
learnallcrules(CRULEsTail).
/*
crulesinconstlist_nonhier(+CONSTLIST, -COR_CRULES) :-
The crulesinconstlist is made up of CONSTLIST, which is a list of the
construction roles that took part in building this particular fur, and
COR_CRULES, which is a list of lists of crules. [[CRULESs],[CRULEs]]
*/
crulesinconstlist_nonhier([CORID|CONSTLIST2], [CRULES|COR_CRULES2]) :- %Listbuild
crulesincor_nonhier(CORID,CRULES),
crulesinconstlist_nonhier(CONSTLIST2, COR_CRULES2).
crulesinconstlist_nonhier([CORID], [CRULES]) :- %Limit
crulesincor_nonhier(CORID,CRULES).
/*
The name of this predicate might change.
crulesinconstlist_hier(+CONSTLIST, -COR_CRULES) :-
The crulesinconstlist is made up of CONSTLIST, which is a list of the
construction roles that took part in building this particular fur, and
COR_CRULES, which is a list of lists of crules. [[CRULESs],[CRULEs]]
*/
crulesinconstlist_hier([CORID|CONSTLIST2], [CRULES|COR_CRULES2]) :- %List builder
crulesincor_hier(CORID,CRULES),
crulesinconstlist_hier(CONSTLIST2, COR_CRULES2).
crulesinconstlist_hier([CORID], [CRULES]) :- %Limit
crulesincor_hier(CORID,CRULES).
/*
learncrule(crule(accrank(+REL,+DEL,+PRIV),+CLASS)) :-
Remember the rankings for CLASS in a FURULE in the Prolog database. If CLASS
has been present in a previousely considered CRULE, then retract the old
FURULE, and make a new FURULE with the appropriate ranking and permissions..
*/
:- dynamic furule/2.
learncrule(crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV),CLASS)) :-
retract(furule(accrank(OLDREL,OLDDEL,OLDPRIV),CLASS)),
/* A furule about this class allready existed, and it is retracted to be
replaced with a new one*/
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max(REL,OLDREL,NEWREL),
max(DEL,OLDDEL,NEWDEL),
addperm(PRIV,OLDPRIV,NEWPRIV),
asserta(furule(accrank(NEWREL,NEWDEL,NEWPRIV),CLASS)).
learncrule(crule(accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV),CLASS)) :-
asserta(furule(accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV),CLASS)).
/* A furule about this class did not exist. It was asserted.*/
/* addperm(NEW,OLDPRIVS,RESULT) :-
Add the NEW permission(s) to the existing permissions.
Predicate used by learncrule.*/
addperm(OP,OLDPRIVS,RESULT) :-
atom(OP),
union([OP],OLDPRIVS,RESULT).
addperm(OP,OLDPRIVS,RESULT) :-
number(OP),
union([OP],OLDPRIVS,RESULT).
addperm(NEWLIST,OLDPRIVS,RESULT) :-
union(NEWLIST,OLDPRIVS,RESULT).
/* collect_furules(?Templist,-Result) :-
Collect all the FURULEs that have been asserted for this functional role,
and put them all in the list Result.*/
collect_furules(Templist,Result):-
FURULE=furule(_,_),
retract(FURULE),
!,
collect_furules([FURULE|Templist],Result).
collect_furules(Result,Result).
/* Ranking an individual object
Post-condition:
For each object, a single accrank.
Precedence to
- forbid (vs. permit).
- more detailed object
- more detailed role
*/
/* ranknou_nonhier(+FURULEs,?OBJECTID,-ACCRANK) :-
ranking without knowing who the user is, and without hierarchy*/
ranknou_nonhier(FURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK) :-
obj(OBJECTID,CLASS,_,_), /* Get the direct class */
member(furule(ACCRANK,CLASS),FURULEs). /* Find the class among the furules,
and pick the accrank from that furule.*/
/* ranknou(+FURULEs,+OBJECTID,-ACCRANK) :-
ranking without knowing who the user is*/
ranknou(FURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK) :-
obj(OBJECTID,CLASS,_,_), /* Get the direct class */
rankrecursive(FURULEs,CLASS,ACCRANK). /* Follow the hierarchy
to find the class closest to the direct class. */
/* try to find in this class */
rankrecursive(FURULEs,CLASS,ACCRANK):- /* Singleton CONSTLIST */
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member(furule(ACCRANK,CLASS),FURULEs),!. /* Find the class among the furules,
and pick the accrank from that furule.*/ /* Red cut */
/* find parent class, and call recursively */
rankrecursive(FURULEs,CLASS,ACCRANK):-
objectParent(CLASS,PARENT),
rankrecursive(FURULEs,PARENT,ACCRANK).
/* Find the closest parent among the furules,
and pick the accrank from that furule.*/
/* rank(+USER,+SESSION,?OBJ,-ACCRANK) :-
Actual ranking with a choice of rules to use.*/
rank(USER,SESSION,OBJ,ACCRANK) :-
ssd_ok(USER),
roles_available(USER,SESSION),
fur(SESSION,FURULEs),!,
OBJ=obj(OBJECTID,_,_,_),
ranknou(FURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK).
rank_nonclasshier(USER,SESSION,OBJ,ACCRANK) :-
ssd_ok(USER),
roles_available(USER,SESSION),
fur(SESSION,FURULEs),!,
OBJ=obj(OBJECTID,_,_,_),
ranknou_nonhier(FURULEs,OBJECTID,ACCRANK).
/* dirindir(?Direct, ?DirIndir)
Given a Direct role return DirIndir: Is this the Direct role or
one of its ancestors?*/
dirindir(Direct, DirIndir) :-
Direct=DirIndir.
dirindir(Direct, DirIndir) :-
ancestor(Direct,DirIndir).
/* ancestor(?ChildID, ?AncestorID) :-
Checing for ancestor for roles. ChildID and AncestorID are of the same
type as the arguments to the structure roleparent. */
ancestor(ChildID, AncestorID) :-
roleparent(ChildID, AncestorID).
ancestor(ChildID, AncestorID) :-
roleparent(ChildID, A1),
ancestor(A1, AncestorID).
/*Checing for ancestor for information objects*/
ancestorInfo(ChildID, AncestorID) :-
objectParent(ChildID, AncestorID).
ancestorInfo(ChildID, AncestorID) :-
objectParent(ChildID, A1),
ancestorInfo(A1, AncestorID).
/* Checking for roles available*/
roles_available(USER,SESSION) :-
findall(ROLEsAssigned,userAssignedRole(USER, ROLEsAssigned),Nonflat),
flatten(Nonflat,ROLEsAvailable),
subset(SESSION, ROLEsAvailable),!.
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roles_available(_,_) :- !,write(’Roles not available for activation!\n’),fail.
/*Implementing dynamic seperation of duties*/
/* ssd_ok(U) :-
ssd_ok if the User has no SSD conflicts
WARNING: TODO: SSD should be checked when assigning roles,
not when ranking.
WARNING: Will fail on first violation.*/
ssd_ok(User) :-
not((ssd(RS,N),
findall(DirIndirRole,(rolemember(User,DirectRole),
dirindir(DirectRole, DirIndirRole)),AvailRoleList),
list_to_set(AvailRoleList,AvailRoleSet),
intersection(RS,AvailRoleSet,T),
length(T,TLength),
TLength >= N,
write(’Static Separation of Duty violation!\n’))).
rolemember(User,Role):-
userAssignedRole(User, USERROLEs) ,
member(Role,USERROLEs).
/* dsd_ok(+SESSION) :-
dsd_ok if the session has no SSD conflicts
WARNING: Will fail on first violation.*/
dsd_ok(SESSION) :-
not((dsd(RS,N),
intersection(RS,SESSION,T),
length(T,TLength),
TLength >= N,
write(’Dynamic Separation of Duty violation!\n’))).
/* shown(+USER,+SESSION,+MINREL,?OBJ,-DEL) :-
Given a user USER that has set a preferred minimum relevance MINREL in
the user interface,
what OBJects are shown, and with what DEL (detail level)*/
shown(USER,SESSION,MINREL,OBJ,DEL) :-
rank(USER,SESSION,OBJ,accrank(REL,DEL,PRIV)),
member(2,PRIV),
REL >= MINREL.
/**************************************
* Policy rules defined for our case *
**************************************/
/**************************************
* Test rules just for testing........... *
**************************************/
reconsult(FileName) :-
retractall(caseDB),
consult(FileName).
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